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ARTICLE 
 
Bringing Animal Protection Legislation Into 
Line With its Purported Purposes: A Proposal 
for Equality Amongst Non-Human Animals 
 JANE KOTZMANN* & GISELA NIP† 
 The United States has a strong history of enacting laws to pro-
tect animals from the pain and suffering inflicted by humans. In-
deed, the passage of the Massachusetts’ Body of Liberties in 1641 
made it the first country in the world to pass such laws. Neverthe-
less, contemporary animal protection laws in all jurisdictions of the 
United States are limited in their ability to adequately realize their 
primary purpose of protecting animals from unnecessary or unjus-
tifiable pain and suffering. This is a result of limited statutory def-
initions of ‘animal’ and far-reaching exclusions commonly found in 
animal protection legislation. These exclusions frequently apply to 
farm animals, animals used in experiments as part of scientific or 
medical research, and animals that are the subject of hunting or 
fishing. While the purpose of animal protection laws is clearly sup-
ported by scientific research, they largely fail to achieve their pur-
poses for most animals. Accordingly, this Article advocates for the 
introduction of an equality principle into animal protection laws in 
order to enable those laws to better meet their primary purpose of 
preventing and punishing cruelty to animals. The Article proposes 
that an equality principle be adapted from international human 
rights law to generally provide that all sentient animals are equal 
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. Im-
plementation of such a principle would require significant amend-
ments to animal protection laws, including the introduction of an 
express statement of equality amongst animals, creation of an 
 
* Dr. Jane Kotzmann is a Lecturer in International Law at Deakin Univer-
sity, Melbourne, Australia. She researches in animal rights and current laws as 
they relate to animals. 
† Gisela Nip is currently Senior Associate to a judge in the Victorian Court of 
Appeal in Australia, and her work involves assisting with criminal and civil law 
appeals. She previously practiced as a solicitor with Clayton Utz in Melbourne.    
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overarching prohibition on conduct causing animals unnecessary 
or unjustifiable pain and suffering, and removal of existing dis-
criminations against animals (including farm animals, research 
animals and animals that are hunted or fished). These amend-
ments, if enacted and enforced, would operate to significantly re-
duce, as well as punish, the unnecessary cruelty that animals ex-
perience in contemporary society. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Many non-human animals do not live well.1 This unfortunate 
reality is frequently a result of the manner in which humans use 
 
1 Note that this paper uses the term “animal” to refer to all animals, excluding 
human beings. While human beings are themselves animals, this popular use of 
the term animal is helpful for the purpose of clear communication. 
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animals.2 Animals that are used in human research are often ex-
posed to chemicals or used in experiments. Animals used by hu-
mans for entertainment are habitually removed from their natural 
habitats and subjected to painful training techniques. Animals 
produced for food are subject to crowding, disease, and painful pro-
cedures in factory farms, which have become increasingly preva-
lent in the last few decades. Even animals that live in the wild are 
not beyond the reach of humans — they are commonly subjected to 
hunting and culling practices.  
Public concern in relation to the situation of animals has led 
to the passage of animal protection laws in all jurisdictions in the 
United States (“U.S.”), as well as in most other western countries.3 
Most animal protection legislation in the United States is enacted 
at the state level, which broadly seeks to protect animals from the 
actions of humans that are likely to cause them unnecessary pain 
or suffering.4  
Animal protection laws, however, do not treat all animals 
equally. Companion animals — those animals that are used by hu-
mans for friendship and company — generally receive the strong-
est levels of legal protection.5 Other animals, including farm ani-
mals and animals used in scientific research, are often exempted 
from anti-cruelty provisions. The level of legal protection provided 
to animals therefore depends on the relationship that humans 
have with those animals.6 This is in spite of scientific research 
demonstrating that most animals (including all vertebrates) are 
sentient, and thus have an equal interest in avoiding pain and suf-
fering.7 Moreover, the public is becoming increasingly concerned 
for non-human animals, including those species with which they 
 
2 See generally MIRKO BAGARIC & KEITH AKERS, HUMANISING ANIMALS: 
CIVILISING PEOPLE (2012). 
3 See infra Part II (discussing current law relating to animal protection in the 
United States). 
4 See infra Part II(B)(1)(ii)–(vi) (describing animal protection laws in Califor-
nia, Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois). 
5 See infra Part II(B)(1)(vii) (summarizing animal protection legislation in 
practice). 
6 Id. 
7 See infra Part IV(B)(ii) (discussing scientific research showing animal abil-
ity to feel pain and to suffer). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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are not necessarily personally involved (for example, farm ani-
mals).8 
This Article proposes amendments to animal protection laws 
that are underpinned by the legal principle of equality. In interna-
tional human rights law, equality is one of the key principles that 
supports the attribution of rights to humans.9 The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) all as-
sert that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights” of people “is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world.”10 In this context, equality means that all 
people, regardless of distinctions such as race, sex, or age, have the 
same entitlement to human rights.11 This is because all people 
have human dignity or inherent value, and respecting human 
rights is the way in which we recognize that dignity in each other.12 
Further, while all people have an equal claim to human rights, this 
does not mean that equal treatment is required; policies should pri-
oritize support for those people that are particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination and are more likely to have their human rights in-
fringed.13 
The equality principle should apply to sentient animals be-
cause they are capable of pain and suffering, and thus have an 
 
8 See infra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing ability of public sentiment and morals to 
influence animal protection laws). 
9 See infra Part IV (explaining justifications and recommendations for an 
equality principle in animal protection law). 
10 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
ICESCR] (emphasis added). 
11 Marcia H. Rioux & Paula C. Pinto, A Time for the Universal Right to Edu-
cation: Back to Basics, 31 BRIT. J. SOC. EDUC. 621, 628 (2010). 
12 Jane Kotzmann & Cassandra Seery, Dignity in International Human 
Rights Law: Potential Applicability in Relation to International Recognition of An-
imal Rights, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 1, 8 (2017) (discussing the meaning of hu-
man dignity in the context of international human rights law). 
13 Human Rights Based Approaches, AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (June 18, 
2013), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-based-approaches 
[https://perma.cc/J6Z9-L3FQ]. 
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equal interest in avoiding that pain and suffering,14 regardless of 
their value to humans. In this respect, scientific research indicates 
that most animals are sentient and can feel both physical and psy-
chological pain in a manner similar to humans.15 Further, consid-
eration of both utilitarian and deontological theories leads to the 
conclusion that animals have moral status and should therefore be 
factored into our moral reasoning.16 It is a general moral norm of 
conduct that humans should avoid action that causes unnecessary 
pain or suffering, and animals should therefore be factored in to 
this standard.17 Further, the equality of interest in avoiding pain 
and suffering that animals experience converges with the pur-
ported purposes of animal protection legislation — to prevent the 
unnecessary pain and suffering of animals.18  
Incorporation of an “equality amongst animals” principle in 
animal protection legislation would require significant legislative 
amendments. In particular, distinctions that may be drawn be-
tween animals or between species, other than those based on their 
level of sentience, such as the ways in which different species are 
used by humans,19 are not relevant to the purposes of animal pro-
tection legislation; therefore, these distinctions should not inform 
the obligations imposed on humans in their relations with animals, 
or the criminal offence taxonomies created by law. Thus, an equal-
ity principle may require amendment to the definition of “animal” 
in legislation to ensure all sentient animals are included. It would 
also require the removal of any exemptions from animal protection 
legislation. Further, legal obligations to animals and animal cru-
elty offences would need to be revised to ensure that they do not 
entrench discrimination against particular species.  
 
14 See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE CLASSIC OF THE 
ANIMAL MOVEMENT 8 (HarperCollins eds., 2009) (2015) (arguing that animals feel 
pain and that their pain should be considered equally with the pain of any other 
being). 
15 See infra Part IV(B)(2) (discussing scientific research relating to animals’ 
capacity to feel pain and suffer).  
16 See infra Part IV(B)(4) (analyzing the moral standing of animals). 
17 Id. 
18 See infra Part IV(B)(5) (providing that the introduction of an equality prin-
ciple into animal protection laws would minimize animal pain and suffering as 
well as reflect public desire for increased legal protection for animals). 
19 See Jessica Eisen, Liberating Animal Law: Breaking Free From Human-
Use Typologies, 17 ANIMAL L. 59, 60–61 (2010). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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This Article demonstrates that amendments to animal protec-
tion legislation that reflect animals’ equal interest in avoiding pain 
and suffering would better align with the purposes of animal pro-
tection laws and better protect species of animals that are com-
monly discriminated against under those laws. While it is acknowl-
edged that many of the problems experienced by animals result 
from their legal property status, and that these reforms would not 
change that status, the reforms may nonetheless improve treat-
ment for particular species. In this respect, it is worthwhile noting 
that significant legal developments generally occur as a result of 
incremental changes in conjunction with evolving social norms. 
The next part of this Article outlines the contemporary law re-
lating to animal protection in the U.S. This includes identification 
of the purposes of animal protection legislation and a summary of 
the obligations and offenses set out in the relevant legislation. Part 
III explains the principle of equality, as set out in international 
human rights law, and its role as a foundation for international 
human rights law. This is followed in Part IV by a discussion of the 
reasons why, as well as how, the principle of equality might be in-
corporated into animal protection law and the changes that would 
be required in order to achieve this.  
II. THE CONTEMPORARY LAW RELATING TO ANIMAL 
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES  
A. Overview of Animal Protection Law 
Before examining the animal protection laws in force in par-
ticular jurisdictions of the U.S., this section sets out a broad over-
view of the framework of animal protection law. The purpose of 
providing this summary is to help explain the current approach to 
animal protection. It will also serve to contextualize the proposal 
being made for the reform of these laws.  
Animal protection laws have a long history in the U.S. In fact, 
the U.S. was the first country in the world to enact laws aimed at 
protecting animals from cruelty and negligence. These laws were 
proclaimed in the Massachusetts’ Body of Liberties in 1641, which 
prohibited “any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature 
7
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which are usuallie kept for man’s use” and required periodic rest, 
food, and water breaks for any cattle being driven or led.20 
In contemporary times, animal protection laws can be, and 
are, passed and enforced at all levels of government in the U.S. At 
the federal level, the key pieces of legislation are the Preventing 
Animal Cruelty and Torture (“PACT”) Act of 2019,21 the Animal 
Welfare Act (“AWA”) of 1966,22 the Twenty-Eight Hour Law of 
1873,23 the Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act (“HMSA”) 
of 1958,24 and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) of 1973.25 How-
ever, most of the legislation relating to animal protection is en-
acted at the state level.26 In this respect, all states have legislation 
in place to protect animals and all states have felony offenses re-
lating to cruelty to animals.27 Further, some cities and counties 
have also enacted animal protection laws, which are often a pre-
cursor to more extensive protections.28 
The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”) publishes the U.S. 
Animal Protection Laws State Rankings on an annual basis, with 
the most recent report being published in 2019.29 In the Rankings 
Report, the ALDF ranks all fifty states in relation to the strength 
of their animal protection laws.30 Each state is given a number 
from one to fifty (with “one” being the best performing state), and 
is further classified as “Top Tier,” “Middle Tier,” or “Bottom Tier.”31 
 
20 Janet M. Davis, The History of Animal Protection in the United States, ORG. 
OF AM. HISTORIANS, https://tah.oah.org/november-2015/the-history-of-animal-pro-
tection-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/E5CL-3RNP]. 
21 Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 
1151 (2019) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48) [hereinafter PACT Act]. 
22 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2020) [hereinafter AWA]. 
23 Twenty-Eight Hour Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2020). 
24 Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act of 1958, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–
1907 (2020) [hereinafter HMSA]. 
25 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2020) [hereinaf-
ter ESA]. 
26 Laws That Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/ar-
ticle/laws-that-protect-animals/ [https://perma.cc/RT3L-7ZCU]. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 2019 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings: The Best and Worst 
States for Animal Protection Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/pro-
ject/2018-us-state-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/57K7-WBBK] [hereinafter Animal 
Protection Laws State Rankings]. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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According to the ADLF, the animal protection laws of the states in 
the “Top Tier” have three strengths and two weaknesses, the laws 
in the “Middle Tier” states have two strengths and three weak-
nesses, and the laws in the “Bottom Tier” states have one strength 
and four weaknesses.32 Looking at the disparity amongst the states 
in the Rankings Report, it is clear that the animal protection laws 
across the U.S., as a whole, do not sufficiently protect the interests 
of animals. On the other hand, the Rankings Report provides op-
portunities for state legislatures to learn from other states and im-
prove the laws within their own jurisdictions.  
The section below will summarize the animal protection laws 
at the federal level and across the five most populated states in the 
U.S.: California, Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois. Of these 
five states, Illinois is in the Top Tier and ranks number one in the 
Rankings Report.33 California (number eight), Florida (number 
ten), and Texas (number eleven) are also in the Top Tier.34 New 
York, however, has been attributed number thirty-two of the fifty 
states and is in the Middle Tier.35  
B. Animal Protection Law and Practice in the United 
States 
1. Overview of Legislation Concerning the 
Purposes, Obligations and Offenses in Animal 
Protection Laws   
i. Federal 
On November 25, 2019, President Donald Trump signed into 
law the PACT Act, which constitutes a new federal ban on some 
forms of animal cruelty.36 The bipartisan bill, which passed the 
House and Senate earlier in 2019, outlaws purposeful crushing, 
burning, drowning, suffocation, impalement, or other violence 
causing serious bodily injury to “one or more living non-human 
 
32 Id. 
33 ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, ANIMAL PROTECTION: U.S. STATE LAWS RANKINGS 
REPORT 6–7 (2019). 
34 Id. at 6. 
35 Id. 
36 PACT Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 (2019) (to be codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 48). 
9
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mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians.”37 Violations of the PACT 
Act may result in a fine or felony sentence of up to seven years’ 
imprisonment for the offender.38 The PACT Act closes a loophole 
which materialized following the introduction of the federal Ani-
mal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, which prohibits anyone 
from knowingly creating an “animal crush video.”39 These are vid-
eos which are posted online, and involve extreme acts of animal 
cruelty and torture, including stepping on, mutilating, or skinning 
animals alive.40 The PACT Act revises section 48 of the U.S. Code, 
which previously dealt only with “animal crush videos,” and ex-
tends the list of prohibited acts of cruelty towards animals beyond 
the making and distribution of such videos.41 There are exemptions 
to the prohibited conduct under the PACT Act, including normal 
and customary veterinary procedures; the slaughter of animals for 
food; hunting, trapping, fishing, and any other sporting activity not 
otherwise prohibited by federal law; pest or predator control; and 
acts of scientific or medical research.42 Despite the exemptions in 
the PACT Act, it is a step in the right direction for the protection 
of animals and prevention of animal abuse in the U.S. 
Before the introduction of the PACT Act, the AWA was the pri-
mary piece of legislation in place to protect animals. The AWA reg-
ulates the treatment of animals in research, exhibition, and 
transport by dealers, ensuring that such animals are provided hu-
mane care and treatment.43 The AWA provides for criminal penal-
ties, civil penalties, and revocation of permits for violations of its 
provisions.44 In this respect, the AWA regulates the interactions 
between humans and animals, which, by nature, are related to in-
terstate or foreign commerce, or that substantially affect such com-
merce.45  
 
37 Id. § 48(f)(1). 
38 See id. § 48(c) (“Whoever violates this section shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned for not more than 7 years, or both.”). 
39 Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010 § 48(b)(1), Pub. L. 111-294, 
124 Stat. 3177. 
40 See, e.g., Justice v. State, 532 S.W.3d 862, 863–64 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017) (de-
termining an animal cruelty case involving “animal crush videos”). 
41 Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010 § 48(a)(1)–(3).  
42 Id. § 48(d). 
43 AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1)–(2) (2020). 
44 Id. § 2149. 
45 Interactions between humans and animals which are intrastate in nature 
are addressed by state legislation.  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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The AWA directs the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture (“USDA”) to “promulgate standards to govern the hu-
mane treatment handling, care, treatment of animals in research, 
exhibition and, transportation of animals, and by dealers,”46 as 
well as the proper handling of these animals during transportation 
in commerce.47 It also prohibits most commercial animal fighting 
(but not bird fighting)48 and prohibits dealers and exhibiters from 
disposing of any dog or cat, either through a sale or otherwise, five 
days after the acquisition of the animal.49 The AWA also requires 
pounds, shelters, and research facilities licensed by the USDA to 
“hold and care for” any dog or cat they acquire for no less than five 
days.50 
In terms of application, the AWA regulates animals that are 
relevant to the contexts identified. This includes live or dead dogs, 
cats, monkeys, guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits, as well as other 
warm-blooded animals that the Secretary determines are being 
used, or are intended for use, in research, for exhibition, or for com-
panionship.51 However, the term expressly excludes birds, rats, 
and mice which are bred for use in research, horses not used for 
research purposes, and other farm animals.52  
While these animals may be covered by relevant state legisla-
tion, their exclusion from the AWA may mean that they are effec-
tively less protected than other species. For example, rats and mice 
used in research are ostensibly not entitled to humane care and 
treatment, whereas other animals used in research are so enti-
tled.53  
The Twenty-Eight Hour Law seeks to ensure the humane and 
proper transportation of animals, including those raised for food or 
 
46 AWA, § 2143(a)(1). 
47 Id. § 2143(a)(4). 
48 Id. § 2156. 
49 Id. § 2135. 
50 Id. § 2158(a). 
51 Id. § 2132(g). 
52 Id.   
53 See Animals Used in Research, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, 
https://aldf.org/focus_area/animals-used-in-research/ [https://perma.cc/Q7TA-
MMEQ] (explaining how mice and rats are some of the most commonly used ani-
mals in experimentation). 
11
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in food production, across state lines.54 Essentially, the law re-
quires vehicles transporting animals for slaughter to stop every 
twenty-eight hours to allow the animals exercise, food, and water.55 
Sheep, however, are able to be confined for an additional eight con-
secutive hours without being unloaded when the twenty-eight hour 
period ends at night.56 The rationale behind this distinction ap-
pears to be based on the difficulty of unloading sheep at night.57 
The objectives of the HMSA include the prevention of needless 
suffering by livestock.58 In accordance with this, among other ob-
jectives, the HMSA declares that “the slaughtering of livestock and 
the handling of livestock in connection with slaughter shall be car-
ried out only by humane methods.”59 Under the legislation, there 
are two lawful methods for the slaughter of livestock. Primarily, 
animals should be “rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or 
gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and 
effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.”60 Al-
ternatively, where applicable, livestock should be slaughtered ac-
cording to the “ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other 
religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter . . . .”61  
The ESA seeks to conserve threatened and endangered species 
and their habitats.62 The law requires federal agencies to ensure 
that any actions they authorize, fund, or undertake are not likely 
to threaten the existence of any listed endangered species, or result 
in the habitats of such species being destructed or adversely modi-
fied.63 The Act also prohibits any action that results in the taking 
of any listed endangered species,64 and prohibits interstate and 
overseas import and export of such species.65 While the ESA ap-
plies to all endangered species, the term is defined so as to exclude 
 
54 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUS., BULL. NO. 589, THE 28-
HOUR LAW REGULATING THE INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LIVE STOCK: ITS 
PURPOSE, REQUIREMENTS, AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (1918). 
55 Id. 
56 Twenty-Eight Hour Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2) (2020).  
57 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUS., supra note 54, at 16. 
58 HMSA, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (2020). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. § 1902(a). 
61 Id. § 1902(b). 
62 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2020). 
63 Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
64 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C). 
65 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A), (E). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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“a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to con-
stitute a pest whose protection . . . would present an overwhelming 
and overriding risk to man.”66  
ii. California 
The main legislative protection for animals in California is 
contained in the California Penal Code.67 Although the Penal Code 
does not contain a provision that specifies the purpose of the legis-
lation, courts have identified that the purpose of the animal pro-
tection law is “to prevent the active or passive infliction of unnec-
essary or unjustifiable pain or suffering, or cruelty, on animals by 
their owner, or keeper, or others.”68 Courts have further held that 
“[i]n our society, those who mistreat animals are the deserved ob-
ject of obloquy, and their conduct is wrongful of itself and not just 
as a matter of legislative declaration.”69 
The list of prohibited acts under the California Penal Code is 
extensive. These acts include: poisoning an animal,70 maliciously 
and intentionally injuring or killing an animal,71 general cruelty 
and neglect,72 maliciously and intentionally injuring or killing a 
threatened or endangered animal,73 keeping an animal without 
proper care and attention,74 improper treatment of animals in live 
animal markets,75 animal fighting,76 confining an animal in an un-
attended motor vehicle,77 cruelty to animals being transported,78 
insufficient food and water for impounded animals,79 abandoning 
 
66 Id. § 1532(6). 
67 CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West 2020).  
68 People v. Untiedt, 116  Cal. Rptr. 899, 900–01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (empha-
sis added). 
69 People v. Speegle, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
70 CAL. PENAL CODE § 596. 
71 Id. § 597(a). 
72 See id. § 597(b). 
73 Id. § 597(c). 
74 Id. § 597.1(a)(1). 
75 See id. § 597.3. 
76 Id. §§ 597.5 (describing dog fighting), 597b(a)–(b) (describing other animal 
fighting), 597c (prohibiting spectators of animal fights), 597j (describing bird 
fights). 
77 Id. § 597.7(a). 
78 Id. §§ 597a (describing general transport), 597o (describing transport for 
slaughter). 
79 Id. § 597e. 
13
 260	 BRINGING	ANIMAL	PROTECTION	LEGISLATION	INTO	LINE	 [Vol.	37	
an animal,80 improper maintenance of pet shops,81 horse poling,82 
horse and cattle “docking,”83 and confining animals without ade-
quate exercise area.84 Other provisions in the Penal Code prohibit 
certain behaviors against animals including sexual assault of ani-
mals,85 and killing dogs or cats for their pelts.86 
In terms of the application of the Penal Code, “animal” means 
“every dumb creature.” 87 Thus, prima facie, a wide range of ani-
mals are protected from acts of general cruelty under this legisla-
tion. Nevertheless, there are a number of exclusions within the leg-
islation. First, the anti-cruelty obligations are not to be interpreted 
as interfering with research experiments involving animals, and 
mandatory seizure and impoundment does not generally apply to 
such animals.88 Second, human conduct in relation to wildlife is, in 
some circumstances, exempt. This is the case where the relevant 
conduct is hunting wild mammals or birds for sport or food in ac-
cordance with other legal provisions, including “game laws,”89 and 
where the relevant conduct is abandoning an animal.90 Further, 
animals intended for slaughter are exempt in some circumstances. 
The protections do not impact “the right to kill all animals used for 
food.”91 Further, the prohibitions on leaving or confining an animal 
in an unattended motor vehicle do not prohibit the transportation 
of farmed animals for agricultural purposes.92 
 
80 Id. §§ 597f(a) (prohibiting abandonment), 597s(a) (imposing misdemeanor 
penalty). 
81 Id. § 597l(a). 
82 Id. § 597g. 
83 Id. § 597n. 
84 Id. § 597t. 
85 Id. § 286.5(a). 
86 Id. § 598a(a). 
87 Id. § 599b. 
88 Id. §§ 597(g)(2), 599c. 
89 Id. § 599c. 
90 Id. § 597s(b) (detailing an exception for the release or rehabilitation of wild-
life). 
91 Id. § 599c. 
92 Id. § 597.7(f).  
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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iii. Texas 
In Texas, the Penal Code prohibits the cruel treatment of both 
livestock animals and non-livestock animals, respectively.93 Like 
the California Penal Code, there is no specific provision stating the 
purpose of the laws. However, the judiciary has commented that 
the law needs to evolve to avoid becoming irrelevant and in this 
context, “law should reflect society’s recognition that animals are 
sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing compan-
ionship to the humans with whom they live.”94 
The Texas Penal Code sets out general anti-cruelty provisions. 
In this respect, it prohibits the torture,95 neglect,96 abandonment,97 
cruel transportation,98 overworking,99 and poisoning of livestock 
animals.100 It also criminalizes causing a livestock animal to fight 
with another animal,101 using a live animal as a lure in relation to 
dog racing,102 and tripping a horse.103 Further, it prohibits similar 
cruelty to non-livestock animals.104 It also criminalizes causing an 
animal to fight with another animal where neither animal is a 
dog.105 Further prohibitions in the Penal Code include interference 
with police service animals,106 attacking an assistance animal,107 
dogfighting,108 cockfighting,109 and bestiality.110 Moreover, the 
 
93 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.09, 42.092 (West 2019).  
94 Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
95 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(1). 
96 Id. § 42.09(a)(2). 
97 Id. § 42.09(a)(3). 
98 Id. § 42.09(a)(4). 
99 Id. § 42.09(a)(9). 
100 Id. § 42.09(a)(5). 
101 Id. § 42.09(a)(6). 
102 Id. § 42.09(a)(7). 
103 Id. § 42.09(a)(8). 
104 Id. §§ 42.092(b)(3)–(6), (9). Note that some of these acts are only criminal-
ized where they occur without the owner’s effective consent. Id. §§ 42.092(b)(2), 
(6). Poisoning is only an offense in relation to livestock other than cattle, horses, 
sheep, swine or goats, where the animal belongs to another person and is done 
without legal authority or the owner’s effective consent. Id. § 42.09(a)(5). 
105 Id. § 42.092(b)(7)–(8). 
106 Id. § 38.151. 
107 Id. § 42.091. 
108 Id. § 42.10. 
109 Id. § 42.105. 
110 Id. § 21.09. 
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Texas Health and Safety Code also prohibits the unlawful restraint 
of a dog.111 
As noted, the Texas Penal Code distinguishes between live-
stock and non-livestock animals, with different prohibitions being 
applicable depending on the category to which the relevant animal 
belongs. In this respect, an animal refers to “a domesticated living 
creature, including any stray or feral cat or dog, and a wild living 
creature previously captured,” but does not include “an uncaptured 
wild living creature or a livestock animal.”112 On the other hand, a 
livestock animal refers to “cattle, sheep, swine, goats, ratites, or 
poultry commonly raised for human consumption . . . a horse, pony, 
mule, donkey, or hinny . . .  native or nonnative hoofstock raised 
under agriculture practices . . .  [or] native or nonnative fowl com-
monly raised under agricultural practices.”113 The clear exemption 
is wild animals that have not been captured, to which the general 
anti-cruelty prohibitions do not apply.  
The legislation also contains further, extensive exemptions 
from the anti-cruelty provisions. In particular, prohibitions on cru-
elty to livestock and non-livestock do not extend to conduct that is 
related to fishing, hunting or trapping, wildlife management or 
control, or animal husbandry and agriculture.114 For example, it is 
a defense to a prosecution for cockfighting that the conduct is a 
“generally accepted and otherwise lawful animal husbandry or ag-
riculture practice.”115 Moreover, it is a defense to a prosecution for 
cruelty to livestock and non-livestock animals, and for cock-
fighting, if the impugned conduct was for bona fide scientific re-
search.116 It is also a defense to prosecution for cruelty to non-live-
stock animals where the actor had a reasonable fear of bodily 
injury by a dangerous wild animal, where the animal was on the 
actor’s property and killed animals or damaged crops on the prop-
erty, or where the conduct was within the scope of the actor’s 
 
111 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 821.077 (West 2019). 
112 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.092(a)(2). 
113 Id. § 42.09(b)(5). 
114 Id. §§ 42.09(f) (describing livestock animals), 42.092(f) (describing non-
livestock animals). 
115 Id. § 42.105(e)(2). 
116 Id. §§ 42.09(e) (describing livestock), 42.092(d)(2) (describing non-live-
stock), 42.105(e)(1) (describing cockfighting). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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employment as a public servant or in operations associated with 
electricity or natural gas generation or delivery.117  
iv. Florida 
The Florida Statute contains various provisions that criminal-
ize cruelty to animals. While the legislature did not include a spe-
cific “purpose” provision with regard to these laws, the courts have 
stated that the “statutory scheme is clear.”118 Further, it has been 
held that for an offense of causing the cruel death of an animal to 
be made out, the statute “does not require an intent to cause the 
cruel death of an animal, but only an intent to commit the act that 
results in the cruel death,” suggesting that the legislation seeks to 
prevent the actions that cause animal pain and suffering rather 
than the intent to cause such pain and suffering.119 
The Florida Statute criminalizes general cruelty and aggra-
vated cruelty to animals. The general cruelty provisions include 
prohibitions on overloading, overdriving, tormenting, depriving of 
sustenance and shelter, mutilating, or killing an animal.120 The ag-
gravated cruelty to animals provisions include prohibitions on 
causing “cruel death” and “excessive or repeated infliction of un-
necessary pain or suffering” to an animal.121 Other offenses against 
animals include tripping horses,122 confining or abandoning ani-
mals,123 animal fighting,124 and sexual assault of an animal.125 
At first glance, the anti-cruelty provisions contained in the 
Florida Statute appear comprehensive, as “animal” is defined as 
“every living dumb creature.”126 However, the definitions of “tor-
ture,” “torment,” and “cruelty” exclude acts that occur “in the in-
terest of medical science.”127 Further, provisions against the killing 
or aggravated abuse of horses or cattle are expressly not to be 
 
117 Id. § 42.092(d)–(e). 
118 Hynes v. State, 1 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
119 Bartlett v. State, 929 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
120 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12(1) (West 2019). 
121 Id. § 828.12(2). 
122 Id. § 828.12(5). 
123 Id. § 828.13. 
124 Id. § 828.122. 
125 Id. § 828.126. 
126 Id. § 828.02. 
127 Id.  
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construed as interfering with “recognized livestock husbandry 
practices.”128 Licensed veterinarians are also immune from prose-
cution for cruelty to animals.129 Moreover, prohibitions on artificial 
coloring and sale of certain animals do not apply where the animals 
are temporarily dyed for protective health purposes,130 and do not 
apply to animals used or raised for agricultural purposes in certain 
circumstances.131 
v. New York  
Laws prohibiting animal cruelty in New York are found in the 
Agriculture and Markets Law.132 While the purposes of the legisla-
tion are expressly stated, they relate to promotion of the agricul-
tural industry rather than animal welfare.133 The offense of aggra-
vated cruelty to “companion animals” was enacted in 1999 in 
response to an incident where a cat “was doused with kerosene and 
set on fire.”134 While there is no statutory statement regarding the 
purpose of this provision, courts have commented on the legislative 
intent to the effect that the provision “represents the Legislature’s 
recognition that man’s inhumanity to man often begins with inhu-
manity to those creatures that have formed particularly close rela-
tionships with mankind.”135 The implication appears to be that 
anti-animal cruelty provisions are aimed at preventing eventual 
cruelty to humans. 
In spite of this, the legislation criminalizes a range of general 
acts of cruelty against animals. These include overdriving, tortur-
ing, and injuring animals;136 aggravated cruelty to animals;137 an-
imal fighting;138 failing to provide appropriate shelter for dogs left 
 
128 Id. § 828.125(5). 
129 Id. § 828.12(4). 
130 Id. § 828.1615(2). 
131 Id. § 828.1615(3). 
132 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 2020). 
133 Id. § 3. 
134 People v. Degiorgio, 36 A.D.3d 1007, 1008–09 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (inter-
nal quotations omitted). 
135 People v. Garcia, 29 A.D.3d 255, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); see also De-
giorgio, 36 A.D.3d at 1009. 
136 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353. 
137 Id. § 353-a. 
138 Id. § 351. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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outdoors;139 tattooing or piercing a companion animal;140 abandon-
ing animals;141 failing to provide proper food and drink to im-
pounded animals;142 carrying or transporting animals in a cruel 
manner;143 poisoning or attempting to poison animals;144 interfer-
ing with or injuring an animal used for racing or breeding;145 and 
throwing injurious substances in public places that could injure 
animals.146 
As with other states, conduct in specified circumstances is ex-
empt from the anti-cruelty to animals provisions. In particular, 
conduct that relates to scientific testing and research involving the 
use of living animals is not encompassed within the prohibition on 
torturing and injuring animals.147 Further, hunting, trapping and 
fishing, dispatch of animals that are diseased or are a threat to 
human safety are exempt from the prohibition on aggravated cru-
elty to companion animals.148 
vi. Illinois  
In Illinois, the Humane Care for Animals Act is the primary 
piece of legislation prohibiting animal cruelty.149 Notwithstanding 
that the Act does not contain a “purpose” statement, its application 
is considered by the courts to be “clear—that being to prevent in-
jury or death to companion animals.150  
The Act prohibits a wide range of conduct relating to animals, 
including beating, cruelly treating, tormenting, starving, and over-
working or otherwise abusing any animal.151 The Act also prohibits 
aggravated cruelty to companion animals,152 torturing animals,153 
 
139 Id. § 353-b. 
140 Id. § 353-f. 
141 Id. § 355. 
142 Id. § 356. 
143 Id. §§ 359, 359-a (extending the protection to the transportation of horses). 
144 Id. § 360. 
145 Id. § 361. 
146 Id. § 362. 
147 Id. § 353. 
148 Id. § 353-a(2). 
149 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01 (2019). 
150 People v. Larson, 885 N.E.2d 363, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
151 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01(a). 
152 Id. § 70/3.02(a). 
153 Id. § 70/3.03. 
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depicting animal cruelty,154 poisoning animals,155 confining ani-
mals in motor vehicles,156 and animal fighting.157 Further, the Act 
also imposes positive obligations on the owners of animals to pro-
vide adequate living conditions.158 
While the Act defines an animal as “every living creature, do-
mestic or wild,” excluding humans,159 a wide range of conduct is 
exempted from the legislative prohibitions. In particular, animal 
torture is defined such that it does not apply to activities “lawfully 
done to an animal.”160 These include death, harm, or injury caused 
by hunting, fishing or trapping; alteration or destruction of an an-
imal pursuant to law by a government representative or veterinar-
ian; and any alteration or destruction of an animal for a legitimate 
purpose, which includes castration, culling, declawing, ear crop-
ping, gelding, neutering, slaughtering, tail docking, and vivisec-
tion.161 Further, the Act’s provisions do not proscribe “normal, good 
husbandry practices” or practices related to the production of live-
stock for food.162 Moreover, while government investigators are au-
thorized to enter private property in order to investigate allega-
tions of animal cruelty, they are not authorized to enter 
institutions operating under federal licenses that conduct research 
experiments using animals.163  
vii. Summary of the Purposes, Obligations and 
Offenses in Animal Protection Laws  
The five states discussed above each have detailed laws 
against animal cruelty, which have been in operation since before 
the enactment of the PACT Act. The legislation in each state tends 
to focus on acts or omissions which cause pain and suffering to 
 
154 Id. § 70/3.03-1. 
155 Id. § 70/6. 
156 Id. § 70/7.1. 
157 Id. § 70/4.01; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/48-1, 5/33G-3(e)(1) (2019) (defining 
dog fighting as a chargeable as a Class 2 felony). 
158 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3(a). 
159 Id. § 70/2.01. 
160 Id. § 70/3.03(b)(4). 
161 Id. § 3.03(b)(1)–(3). 
162 Id. § 70/13; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-35(g) (excluding from the 
prohibition of sexual conduct with an animal any act constituting accepted animal 
husbandry). 
163 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(a). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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animals. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, the purpose of the legisla-
tion is to minimize the unnecessary pain and suffering experienced 
by animals. In this respect, the legislation implicitly accepts that 
animals are sentient creatures. 
Yet although acceptance that animals are sentient is inherent 
within animal protection legislation, many animals are excluded 
from legal protection. The legal definition of “animal” varies be-
tween states. Some states differentiate between “companion ani-
mals,”164 “non-livestock animals”,165 and animals which are wild or 
are livestock. Animals receive varying levels of protection depend-
ing on which category they fall within. Further, many animals are 
excluded from protection entirely. For example, in most jurisdic-
tions, it appears to be acceptable to cause animals pain and suffer-
ing if it is done in the pursuit of sports such as hunting or fishing, 
in relation to scientific or research experiments, or as part of ani-
mal husbandry practices or other accepted agricultural practices. 
In this respect, most jurisdictions exclude farm animals from pro-
tection — according to the Humane Society of the U.S., only sixteen 
states out of fifty-two have laws providing protection for farm ani-
mals.166 It should be noted that these exclusions are not made be-
cause the animals in question feel less pain or suffer less; it is sci-
entifically accepted that most animals are sentient,167 and the 
animals in question here are not those whose sentience is in doubt. 
Rather, the animals are not protected because it is perceived that 
humans have something to gain from the activities in question, and 
pursuant to the laws, any kind of human interest trumps the in-
terest that animals have in not being subjected to pain or suffering. 
2. Overview of Animal Protection Practice  
This section of the Article will examine the ways in which the 
animal protection laws discussed above have been used in practice, 
 
164 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a(1) (McKinney 2020). 
165 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.092(a)(2) (West 2019). 
166 HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., HUMANE STATE RANKING 2018 (ALABAMA 
THROUGH MISSOURI) 2 (2018), https://blog.humanesociety.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/12/State-Rank-2018-AL-MO-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPK3-JFEA]; 
HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., HUMANE STATE RANKING 2018 (MONTANA THROUGH 
WYOMING) 2 (2018), https://blog.humanesociety.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/12/State-Rank-2018-MT-WY-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RMD-SFNP]. 
167 See infra Part IV(B)(2) (discussing scientific research showing animals’ 
ability to feel pain and to suffer). 
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at a federal level, and also in each of the five states. The focus is on 
the ways that animals are, and are not, protected by the relevant 
laws. In particular, this Article is interested in whether the laws 
operate in practice to discriminate against particular animals on 
the basis of their species or other status. 
i. Federal 
Unsurprisingly, despite the existence of some federal legal 
protection to prevent animals from being treated cruelly, the exist-
ing laws are not sufficient to prevent harm to all animals. While 
the PACT Act introduced a federal ban on animal cruelty, exemp-
tions still apply to certain bodies and industries.168 In any event, it 
is too early to analyze any prosecutions under this new law, and 
this discussion will focus on other federal laws such as the AWA, 
the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, and the HSMA.  
The AWA covers only about 5- to 10% of laboratory animals 
because it defines “animal” to exclude rats and mice bred for re-
search,169 and rats and mice reportedly constitute 90 to 95% of an-
imals used in research in the U.S.170 This legislation also does not 
apply to farm animals,171 of which more than nine billion are 
slaughtered annually in the country.172 Further, while criminal 
sanctions are available under the AWA, they are seldom used.173  
Prior to 1998, an observer of alleged mistreatment of animals 
in research or exhibitions could not establish standing to sue under 
the AWA. This changed in the seminal case of Animal Legal De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman,174 in which the Court of Appeals in 
the D.C. Circuit recognized that a plaintiff could experience aes-
thetic injury by observing primates living in inhumane conditions 
 
168 See discussion supra Part II(B)(1)(i) (discussing overview of federal animal 
protection law and practice in the U.S.). 
169 AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)(1) (2020). 
170 Henry Cohen, The Animal Welfare Act, 2 J. ANIMAL L. 13, 13 (2006); see 
also AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g). 
171 AWA § 2132(g)(3). 
172 Cohen, supra note 170, at 13. 
173 AWA § 2149(d); see David Favre, Overview of U.S. Animal Welfare Act, 
ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2002), https://www.animallaw.info/article/overview-
us-animal-welfare-act [https://perma.cc/8H8Q-UC7L]. 
174 154 F.3d 426, 431–32 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
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in animal exhibitions, thereby establishing standing.175 However, 
standing only gets a lawsuit through the metaphorical and literal 
doors of a court. The argument this Article has pursued from the 
beginning of this section — that the exemptions under the AWA 
render its application too narrow to be properly effective in pre-
venting animal abuse — remains unaffected by the expansion of 
standing. 
The Twenty-Eight Hour Law also has obvious limitations. 
First, it does not apply if the vehicle in which animals are being 
transported already contains access to food or water.176 Birds such 
as chickens and turkeys, which are the most-farmed animals in the 
U.S., are also considered exempt.177 Further, the enforcement of 
this law has been less than stringent. The USDA, which is tasked 
with implementing the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, has not developed 
any systematic monitoring program to oversee the transportation 
of animals, despite efforts by humane organizations.178 Accord-
ingly, in practice, the law relating to the transportation of animals 
in the U.S. is entirely ineffective. 
Similarly, the protections provided under the HMSA suffer 
from significant limitations. First, like the Twenty-Eight Hour 
Law, the HMSA protections do not extend to chickens, turkeys, and 
other birds.179 Second, the way in which the HMSA is enforced is 
also often criticized as being inconsistent by government inspec-
tors.180 Although federal suspensions under HMSA increased in 
2008, after the release of a video recording inhumane handling of 
animals in a beef facility resulted in the largest beef recall in U.S. 
history, the number of suspensions gradually decreased until 
 
175 See Mountain States Legal Fund v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (held that “[f]or each claim, if constitutional and prudential standing 
can be shown for at least one plaintiff, we need not consider the standing of the 
other plaintiffs to raise that claim.”). 
176 Twenty-Eight Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502(c) (2020). 
177 Laws that Protect Animals, supra note 26. 
178 ANIMAL WELFARE INST., LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR FARM ANIMALS DURING 
TRANSPORT 3, https://awionline.org/sites/default/files/uploads/legacy-uploads/doc-
uments/FA-LegalProtectionsDuringTransport-081910-1282577406-document-
23621.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB58-P7ZQ].  
179 See HMSA, 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (2020). All “livestock” are rendered insensi-
ble to pain so long as method of slaughtering or handling is rapid and effective. 
180 Laws That Protect Animals, supra note 26. 
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2013.181 Third, in terms of means of enforcement, in theory shut-
ting down a plant should provide a strong disincentive to future 
offences.182 However, this is not necessarily the case, particularly 
for large plants, which are often suspended for less than a day.183 
While criminal prosecutions are likely to serve as an effective de-
terrent for egregious conduct, reports by the USDA Food Safety 
and Inspection Service show that since at least 2007, the USDA 
has not initiated any civil or criminal proceedings for inhumane 
slaughter of animals against licensed plants.184 Rather, the USDA 
has only taken action against illegal establishments (i.e., “back-
yard” operations).185 Overall, it appears that enforcing the HMSA 
is a relatively low priority within the USDA.186 
ii. California 
As explained above, “animal,” for the purposes of animal cru-
elty legislation in California, means “every dumb creature.”187 Cal-
ifornian courts have construed the phrase “dumb creatures” to en-
compass all animals except human beings. For example, in People 
v. Baniqued, the court found that roosters and other birds are 
plainly included in the phrase “dumb creatures.”188  
iii. Texas 
An animal, for the purposes of Texas animal cruelty laws, is 
defined as “a domesticated living creature, including any stray or 
feral cat or dog, and a wild living creature previously captured. The 
term does not include an uncaptured wild living creature or a live-
stock animal.”189 As discussed above, there are specific provisions 
prohibiting acts of cruelty to both livestock and non-livestock 
 
181 See ANIMAL WELFARE INST., HUMANE SLAUGHTER UPDATE: FEDERAL AND 
STATE OVERSIGHT OF THE WELFARE OF FARM ANIMALS AT SLAUGHTER 6 (2017), 
https://awionline.org/sites/default/files/products/FA-HumaneSlaughterReport-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLJ2-3E4Y]. 
182 Id. at 8. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 9. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 CAL. PENAL CODE § 599b (West 2020). 
188 85 Cal. App. 4th 13, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
189 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.092(a)(2) (West 2019). 
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animals.190 In this respect, there have been many successful pros-
ecutions in Texas under the sections prohibiting cruelty to both 
livestock and non-livestock animals. Courts have determined that 
the animal cruelty laws in Texas apply to a range of different ani-
mals, including dogs,191 cats,192 goats,193 and cows.194  
While animal cruelty laws seem to apply to many different 
species of domesticated animals, the application of this law in 
Texas is confined by its narrow statutory definition of an animal 
as being a “domesticated living creature” or any “wild living crea-
ture previously captured.”195 This means that the law does not pro-
vide any protection for animals over which no one has custody, 
such as wild or stray animals. This aspect of the Texas animal pro-
tection laws has often been criticized, particularly in light of a 2002 
court case in Waco, Texas, in which  the defendants shot a home-
less cat (which had been named Queso and cared for by employees 
 
190 See supra Part II(B)(1)(iii) (discussing overview of Texas legislation re-
garding purposes, obligations, and offenses in animal protection laws). 
191 See, e.g., Justice v. State, 532 S.W.3d 862, 865–66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017) 
(upholding a felony conviction for cruelty to a puppy); Mouton v. State, 513 S.W.3d 
679, 683 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming conviction under Tex. Penal Code § 42.092 
for cruelty to dogs when they were found in bad health and living in unsuitable 
conditions); Swilley v. State, 465 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding 
felony offense conviction under Texas Penal Code § 42.092 for cruelty to a dog by 
shooting it with a crossbow). 
192 See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 455 S.W.3d 669, 678–79 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (up-
holding conviction for cruelty to non-livestock animal for failing to provide ade-
quate living conditions at a cat sanctuary); Celinski v. State, 911 S.W.2d 177, 
180–81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding conviction for cruelty to animals by poi-
soning and microwaving cats). 
193 See, e.g., Qaddura v. State, No. 2-05-361-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1493 
(Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2007). In this case, the defendant was charged with the 
offense of cruelty to animals for failing to provide necessary food for one or more 
goats in his custody, abandoning the goat(s), and confining the goat(s) in a cruel 
manner. Id. at *1–2. The defendant had arranged for his tenant to feed and water 
the animals while he was away from his home for more than a month. Id. at *6. 
However, the only thing the defendant left his tenant to feed the animals was 
moldy hay. Id. When a grain delivery was attempted, no one was present to re-
ceive the grain, so the truck driver left without delivering the grain. Id. It was 
discovered that the water troughs contained little, if any, water. Id. at *7. The 
defendant was found guilty under § 42.09 (cruelty to livestock animals) and his 
conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id. at *9. 
194 See, e.g., Westfall v. State, 10 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). The de-
fendant in Westfall was found guilty of animal cruelty to their cattle when they 
failed to adequately provide sustenance and care for the cattle, resulting in death, 
emaciation, and malnourishment of the cows. Id. at 93. 
195 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.092(a)(2) (West 2019). 
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of a restaurant nearby where it spent time) with a pellet gun, 
struck the cat with a golf club, decapitated it, and skinned its 
head.196 One defendant was found not guilty of any misdemeanor 
animal cruelty offense, and charges against the other defendant 
were dropped, since the evidence against him was the same and 
was held to be insufficient to uphold a claim.197 The court held that 
the cat was not protected under the law because it had not been 
captured or domesticated.198 
It is highly problematic that the application of animal protec-
tion laws in Texas depends on the use humans ascribe to animals 
because this is not reflective of any difference in animal sentience. 
For example, cats are the subject of both the Waco case and the 
case of Celinski v. State.199 In Celinski, the defendant, who tortured 
pet cats by poisoning and burning them in a microwave oven, was 
found guilty of the misdemeanor animal cruelty offense.200 Both 
cases involved inhumane and cruel treatment of cats, yet the cats 
in Celinski v. State are protected under the law, while the cat in 
the Waco case was not protected only because it was a stray and 
not domesticated. This legal situation implies that an animal’s 
value and its rights are determined entirely by human ownership, 
which is not in keeping with the purposes of animal protection leg-
islation to prevent animal pain and suffering. The discrimination 
between domesticated and wild animals, expressly stated in the 
statutory definition of “animal,” is insufficient to fully protect ani-
mals against abuse under state law in Texas.  
 
196 See generally Brandi Dean, Opening Statements, First Witnesses Mark 
Start of Trial for Derek Brehm, BAYLOR U. LARIAT ARCHIVES (Mar. 19, 2002), 
https://www.baylor.edu/lariatarchives/news.php?action=story&story=17753 
[https://perma.cc/VD77-2HTN]; Stephen Dove, Jury Finds Baseball Player ‘Not 
Guilty’ of Cruelty to Animals, BAYLOR U. LARIAT ARCHIVES (Mar. 20, 2002), 
https://www.baylor.edu/lariatarchives/news.php?action=story&story=17759 
[https://perma.cc/Z2Q7-ALQL].  
197 See Dylan Forest, Hangin’ Judge Roy Bean “Justice” Prevails in Texas for 
Feral Cats, ANIMAL PEOPLE (May 1, 2002), https://newspaper.animalpeople-
forum.org/2002/05/01/hangin-judge-roy-bean-justice-prevails-in-texas-for-feral-
cats/ [https://perma.cc/4WSA-5S4L].  
198 See Gianna M. Ravenscroft, Overview of Texas Animal Cruelty Laws, 
ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2002), https://www.animallaw.info/article/overview-
texas-animal-cruelty-laws [https://perma.cc/NDU8-7X29]. 
199 911 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
200 Id. at 181. 
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iv. Florida 
Animal protection laws in Florida define “animal” as “every 
living dumb creature,”201 which is almost identical to the definition 
of “animal” as “every dumb creature” in the California Penal Code. 
Unlike states that have offenses of aggravated animal cruelty only 
against pets or “companion animals” (for example, New York, 
which is discussed later in this section), one can be convicted of 
felony cruelty to any animal in Florida.  
In Bartlett v. State, for example, the appellate court affirmed 
a conviction for felony cruelty to animals where the defendant shot 
an opossum countless times with a BB gun and the animal had to 
be euthanized as a result. 202  The court did comment, however, that 
the felony cruelty offenses under section 828.12 create a “potential 
tension” between criminal conduct and lawful hunting, and ob-
served that “[t]his fuzziness could be corrected by amending the 
criminal statute to require that the actor intend to cause the re-
sults that the statute seeks to avoid — a cruel death or unneces-
sary pain or suffering.”203 Courts have also held that “the statutory 
scheme [regarding animal cruelty] is clear … [if a] person inten-
tionally commits an act which results in a cruel death or in exces-
sive or repeated pain or suffering, a felony is committed.”204  
These statements highlight the way in which exemptions op-
erate in Florida. While animal protection laws purport to prevent 
acts that cause pain or suffering to animals, they are undermined 
by exemptions that prioritize human interests. Here, the desire of 
humans to hunt animals is prioritized over the pain or suffering 
that animals may experience as a result.  
v. New York  
In New York, “animal” is defined in the Agriculture and Mar-
kets Law as “every living creature except a human being.”205 A per-
son is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when “with no 
 
201 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.02 (West 2019). 
202 929 So. 2d 1125, 1125–26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
203 Id. at 1126; see also William Scott Bartlett, Appellant, v. State of Florida, 
Appellee, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST.  CTR. (2020), https://www.animal-
law.info/case/bartlett-v-state [https://perma.cc/YBU6-HWDV]. 
204 Hynes v. State, 1 So. 3d 328, 330–31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
205 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350(1) (McKinney 2020). 
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justifiable purpose, he or she intentionally kills or intentionally 
causes serious physical injury to a companion animal with aggra-
vated cruelty.”206 A companion animal under the statute is “any 
dog or cat,” as well as “any other domesticated animal normally 
maintained in or near the household of the owner or person who 
cares for such other domesticated animal,” but does not include 
certain farm animals.207  
New York appears to be relatively broad when construing its 
definition of “companion animal;” courts have expanded the defini-
tion to include fish and reptiles, animals which are excluded in 
equivalent laws in other states. In People v. Garcia, the defendant 
stomped to death a pet goldfish, and was convicted of aggravated 
animal cruelty, among other crimes.208 The trial court held that the 
pet goldfish was a “companion animal” within the meaning of the 
statute because a companion animal “need only be cared for and 
maintained in or near the household of its human owner.”209 In this 
case, among other things, the fish in the tank all had names, the 
fish tank was regularly cleaned, and the owner of the fish reacted 
to the defendant’s actions (smashing the tank against a wall) by 
hurriedly fetching a new bowl of water for the fish.210 On appeal, 
the defendant argued that a fish is not a companion animal; the 
appellate court rejected his argument and upheld the trial court’s 
decision.211 This broad approach to the definition of “companion an-
imal” was further applied in People v. Lohnes,212 in which the court 
stated that a horse (which the defendant had stabbed to death) 
could be considered a “companion animal” for the purpose of aggra-
vated animal cruelty legislation when it is “normally maintained 
in or near the household of the owner or person who cares for 
[it].”213 Horses are considered farm animals and thus not compan-
ion animals when they are “raised for commercial or subsistence 
purposes.”214  
 
206 Id. § 353-a(1). 
207 Id. § 350(5). 
208 777 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
209 Id. at 851. 
210 Id.  
211 People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70, 73 (App. Div. 2006). 
212 976 N.Y.S.2d 719, 719–721 (App. Div. 2013). 
213 Id. at 721 (internal quotations omitted). 
214 Id. internal quotations omitted). 
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As observed, the courts in New York tend to be more liberal in 
defining what a “companion animal” is, and this broadens the op-
eration of the aggravated cruelty to animal offenses. In spite of 
this, the inherent issue with New York animal laws, with respect 
to the sentience of animals, still exists: the protection of animals is 
determined by human categorization or use of the animals.215 In 
the context of animal cruelty offenses, to focus on human actions 
in relation to animals is to disregard the capacity of animals to ex-
perience pain and suffering. The legal demarcation between com-
panion animals and non-companion animals in New York is per-
haps explained by the legislative intent of its animal protection 
laws, which is to recognize the connection between animal abuse 
and violence towards humans: “[t]he connection between animal 
abusers and violence towards humans shows that virtually every 
serial killer had a history of abusing animals before turning their 
attention to people.”216 This purpose is anomalous in the context of 
animal protection laws across the U.S., which are generally di-
rected towards the protection of animals. While it is valid to recog-
nize the connection between animal abuse and violence toward hu-
mans, it is a rather problematic starting point for animal 
protection laws. Such laws should primarily protect animals, not 
humans, as there are many other laws which achieve that purpose. 
Further, animal protection laws should not afford protection to 
only specific species of animals, which are considered protected un-
der the law by reference to the value that humans assign to them. 
vi. Illinois  
The Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act defines “Animal” as 
“every living creature, domestic or wild, but does not include 
man.”217 In assessing the Act, an Illinois court has recognized that 
“the evil the statute intends to prevent, i.e., the intentional killing 
or injuring of companion animals.”218 “Companion animal” is 
 
215 See, e.g., Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (examining N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW 
§ 353-a).   
216 N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., DEP’T OF AGRIC. & MKTS. – AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO 
ANIMALS, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, 222d Sess., at 1585 (1999). 
217 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.01 (West 2019). 
218 People v. Larson, 885 N.E.2d 363, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). In this case, the 
defendant shot and killed the family dog, the court held that “a person of ordinary 
intelligence would reasonably know that, absent an affirmative defense, she or he 
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defined as “an animal that is commonly considered to be, or is con-
sidered by the owner to be, a pet … [it] includes, but is not limited 
to, canines, felines, and equines,”219 and cats,220 horses,221 and 
dogs.222 
The courts have also compared cruelty to animals to cruelty to 
humans. In People v. Robards, the defendant appealed her convic-
tion for two counts of aggravated animal cruelty under the Hu-
mane Care for Animals Act after her two dogs were discovered 
dead in her previous home, emaciated, and dehydrated.223 The de-
fendant was sentenced to twelve months’ probation. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the prosecutor failed to prove that she in-
tended to cause serious injury or death to the dogs. The appellate 
court rejected her argument and held that, for conviction, it is only 
necessary that the act itself was intentional and it caused the 
death or serious injury of an animal. The court further stated that 
the defendant was “very fortunate to have only received a sentence 
of 12 months’ probation for these heinous crimes,” and criticized 
the lower court for its “unjustly and inexplicably lenient” sentence, 
simply because the defendant caused harm to an animal and not 
to a human being:  
Harm to a human being is neither an element of the offense nor a 
statutory aggravating factor. Thus, it makes no sense to consider 
the absence of harm to a human being as a mitigating factor in 
cases involving aggravated cruelty to a companion animal. In ar-
guing for mitigation on this ground, a convicted defendant is es-
sentially saying, ‘Yes, I abused and killed a dog, but at least I 
didn’t abuse and kill the owner too.’ While such restraint should 
be applauded, it does not support a reduced sentence for aggra-
vated cruelty to a companion animal. In this case, the defendant 
abandoned her dogs and left them alone to die. There can be no 
 
may not simply grab a firearm, take the family dog outside, and shoot the dog in 
the head three times so as to kill it.” Id.  
219 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.01a. 
220 See People v. Curtis, 944 N.E.2d 806, 806–16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). In this 
case, the court noted that the defendant was not permitted to own companion 
animals after it was found that she failed to provide humane care and treatment 
to one of her cats that required medical care. Id. at 811. 
221 See People v. Lee, 41 N.E.3d 994, 994–1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
222 See People v. Robards, 97 N.E.3d 600, 600–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); see also 
People v. Land, 955 N.E.2d 538, 538–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Larson, 885 N.E.2d 
at 363–76. 
223 97 N.E.3d at 601.  
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doubt that the defendant’s acts caused serious physical harm and 
death to two sentient creatures that suffered greatly from terminal 
starvation and dehydration, which the defendant callously in-
flicted on them.224 
The comments from this court in Illinois reflect the legislative in-
tent of the Humane Care for Animals Act. In this way, the laws in 
Illinois focus more on the subject of the legislation (animals), ra-
ther than on humans, unlike the laws in New York. The law in 
Illinois recognizes that companion animals deserve to be protected 
against cruel treatment in their own right, not because of the cor-
relation between violent behavior towards animals and violent of-
fending against humans.  
While this attitude towards enforcing animal protection laws 
has obviously resulted in extensive animal protection provisions, 
which has in turn secured Illinois the top spot in the Rankings Re-
port,225 the issue not addressed by the Illinois legislature is that 
many of the protections available under the Humane Care for An-
imals Act only apply to “companion animals.” As this Article has 
argued above, any law that draws a distinction between animals 
that are capable of feeling pain,226 and that invertebrates, such as 
eels and crustaceans, may also have the capacity to experience 
pain.227 
 
224 Id. at 604–05. 
225 Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note 29. 
226 See, e.g., Lynne U. Sneedon, Evolution of Nociception and Pain: Evidence 
from Fish Models, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1, 1 (2019) (concluding that 
it is highly likely that fish experience pain); K.P. Chandroo et al., Can Fish Suf-
fer?: Perspectives on Sentience, Pain, Fear and Stress, 86 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. 
SCI. 225, 225 (2004) (suggesting fish can experience affective states of pain, fear, 
and stress); VICTORIA BRAITHWAITE, DO FISH FEEL PAIN? 183 (2010) (concluding 
that fish feel pain). 
227 See, e.g., E. Lambooij et al., Welfare Aspects of Live Chilling and Freezing 
of Farmed Eel (Anguilla Anguilla L.): Neurological and Behavioural Assessment, 
210 AQUACULTURE 159, 166 (2002) (observing responses to pain stimuli in eels); 
see G. Fiorito, Is There “Pain” in Invertebrates?, 12 BEHAV. PROCESSES 383, 386 
(1986) (concluding that invertebrates possess a pain system); see also Stuart Barr 
et al., Nociception or Pain in a Decapod Crustacean?, 75 ANIMAL BEHAV. 745, 749–
50 (2008) (asserting that prolonged rubbing and grooming are consistent with the 
idea of pain in crustaceans). 
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vii. Summary of Animal Protection Practice  
The above discussion has considered the application of animal 
cruelty laws to different animal species in various jurisdictions, 
and in doing so, has highlighted particular judicial rulings and 
comments. A common theme that emerges from this analysis is 
that courts have taken a liberal approach to defining the term “an-
imals,” insofar as it relates to the protection of animals under leg-
islation. While legislatures in certain states have demarcated be-
tween animals to be protected under the law and animals which 
are not afforded the same legal protection,228 there appears to be a 
willingness by the courts to recognize the sentience of most, if not 
all, animals.229 Further, while some of these laws offer varying de-
grees of protection to different “classes” of animals (for example, 
“companion” or “non-livestock” animals seem to be better protected 
under law when compared to the kind of protection that is availa-
ble to “livestock” animals), courts are prepared to extend the defi-
nition of “animal” under animal protection laws beyond the “usual” 
companion animals or pets such as dogs and cats, to animals such 
as opossums, roosters, and goldfish.  
It is also apparent from the above discussion that legislative 
discrimination between animals on the basis of species member-
ship has an enormous impact in operation. This is best illustrated 
by reference to the federal jurisdiction. While the AWA prohibits 
the cruel treatment of animals used in research, it excludes rats 
and mice, bred for the use in research, from this protection.230 In 
practice, rats and mice constitute the vast majority of animals used 
for research, and thus the anti-cruelty provisions have a very lim-
ited impact on the overall treatment of animals used in scientific 
and research experiments. Similarly, while chickens and turkeys 
are the most-farmed animals in the U.S., they are excluded from 
the protections provided by the Twenty-Eight Hour Law and the 
HMSA.231 Thus, the protections provided by these laws actually 
 
228 See supra Section I(B)(1)(iv).  
229 See, e.g., Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
230 AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2018). 
231 Laws that Protect Animals, supra note 26; see HSMA, 7 U.S.C. § 1902 
(2018). The statute does not address chickens and turkeys. Id.; see also Twenty- 
Eight Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2018). The statute generally addresses ani-
mals, but does specifically indicate which are protected. Id. 
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have a limited scope of operation in relation to the overall picture 
of farm animal welfare. 
Overall, it appears that the inherent discrimination between 
animal species, which results in an inequality of status and protec-
tion among species of animals under the law, is perpetuated by the 
very laws that are designed to protect them. This is problematic 
because it sends a message to the communities in which those laws 
operate that not all animals are to be treated equally; that while 
animals are sentient, the ways in which they are protected are de-
pendent not on their sentience, but on the use that humans ascribe 
to them. This approach further encourages people to view animals 
as valuable only in respect of the ends to which humans can put 
them, rather than as inherently valuable in themselves.  
III. THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE 
A. Equality in International Human Rights Law 
One of the core principles of international human rights law is 
equality. The principle of equality is embedded in all the docu-
ments making up the international bill of rights: the UDHR, the 
ICCPR, and the ICESCR. The UDHR identifies the “recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family [as] the foundation of world freedom, 
justice and peace.”232 Article 1 repeats the assertion that “[a]ll hu-
man beings are born free and equal,”233 while article 7 provides 
that “[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law.”234 Similarly, the pre-
ambles of the ICCPR and ICESCR each recognize the “inherent 
dignity and … equal and inalienable rights” of human beings.235 
Like article 7 of the UDHR, article 26 of the ICCPR provides for 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law.236 Thus, 
the equality principle is expressed in treaty law, inter alia, as a 
recognition that human beings are equal in value, a requirement 
that rights must be enjoyed without discrimination, together with 
 
232 UDHR, supra note 10, Preamble. 
233 Id. at art. 1. 
234 Id. at  art. 7. 
235 ICCPR, supra note 10, at 1; ICESCR, supra note 10, at 1.  
236 ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 26. 
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an independent and generally applicable right to equality before 
the law, and equal protection of the law.237 
The principle of equality is also prominent in other key human 
rights treaties. It is reflected in treaties including the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child,238 the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families,239 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.240 Further, two United Nations (“UN”) human 
rights treaties were established explicitly to prohibit discrimina-
tion, being the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination241 and the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.242 In all of 
these treaties, UN Members have proclaimed that every person is 
equally entitled to all of the rights and freedoms set out in these 
covenants, and are committed to ensure that the rights are to be 
enjoyed without discrimination or inhibition.  
It is unsurprising then, that equality is one of the central prin-
ciples underpinning any human rights based approach to a partic-
ular issue.243 In this respect, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
stated that “[n]on-discrimination, together with equality before the 
law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, 
constitute a basic and general principle relating to the protection 
of human rights.”244 Thus, where a human rights based approach 
is taken in a particular context, the principle of equality and non-
 
237 JOHN TOBIN, Understanding a Human Rights Based Approach to Matters 
Involving Children: Conceptual Foundations and Strategic Considerations, in 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 61, 70 (Antonella Invernizzi & Jane Williams 
eds., 2011). 
238 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2, ¶ 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 46. 
239 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, art. 7, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 97. 
240 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 5, ¶ 1, Dec. 13, 
2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 75. 
241 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, art. 2, ¶ 1, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
242 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, art. 2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
243 TOBIN, supra note 237, at 70. 
244 United Nations Human Rights Comm., Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General 
Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination (Thirty-seventh session, 1989), ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 1 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment 18].  
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discrimination must be employed, together with the other general 
express principles of a human rights-based approach – accounta-
bility and participation.245 
In the following sections, this Article outlines the substantive 
content of the obligations that flow from the principle of equality: 
the non-discrimination requirement and the right to equal treat-
ment before the law and equal protection of the law. In providing 
this overview, the Article will focus on the requirements of the 
UDHR and ICCPR, which generally illustrate what equality and 
non-discrimination encompass, and how they have been applied in 
case law. 
B. Substantive Content of the Non-Discrimination 
Requirement 
Article 1 of the UDHR provides “[a]ll human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”246 Article 2 provides a general statement of equality 
as follows: “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in [the UDHR], without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.”247 This statement 
is echoed in Article 2 of the ICCPR: “[e]ach State Party to the pre-
sent Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individu-
als within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights rec-
ognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”248 
This declaration is complemented by more specific protections set 
out later in the ICCPR. For example, article 3 stresses the im-
portance of non-discrimination between men and women, article 
23(4) requires state parties to take adequate steps to ensure equal-
ity of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage (during 
marriage and at its dissolution), and article 24 prohibits any 
 
245 See TOBIN, supra note 237, at 61–62. 
246 UDHR, supra note 10, art. 1.  
247 Id. at art. 2. 
248 ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 2. 
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discrimination against children based on race, color, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property, or birth.249 
The non-discrimination obligation essentially requires that 
people not be treated unfavorably in respect of their rights on the 
basis of a distinction that is irrelevant or unreasonable in the par-
ticular context, when compared to how others would be treated. 
For example, prohibiting the torture and inhumane treatment of 
all people except for African Americans would constitute unlawful 
discrimination against African Americans on the basis of race.250 
In certain circumstances, however, the principle of equality can re-
quire a state to take affirmative action in order to reduce or elimi-
nate conditions that cause or help to perpetuate discrimination. 
Where, for example, a particular population is subject to genera-
tional poverty, it may be appropriate to grant members of the pop-
ulation certain preferential treatment in particular matters when 
compared with the rest of the population. Such treatment consti-
tutes “legitimate differentiation.”251 
Thus, under international human rights law, not every differ-
ence or distinction in treatment will automatically amount to un-
lawful discrimination. In Broeks v. The Netherlands,252 the Human 
Rights Committee (“HRC”) held that “[a] differentiation based on 
reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited dis-
crimination within the meaning of article 26.”253 Thus, generally, 
under international law, the principle of discrimination is violated 
where identical or equal cases are treated differently, there is no 
objective or reasonable justification for this difference in treat-
ment, and the means are not proportionate to the objective to be 
achieved.254  
 
249 Id. at art. 3, 23(4), 24. 
250 Note that “age” would come within the parameter of “other status” here.  
251 General Comment 18, supra note 244, ¶ 10. 
252 Communication No. 172/1984, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, HRC 
(Apr. 9, 1987). 
253 Id. at ¶ 13.  
254 See id. 
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These requirements have been expressed clearly in writings 
by international human rights supervisory bodies, including the 
European Court of Justice,255 and the HRC.256  
C. Substantive Content of the Right to Equality before 
the Law and Equal Protection of the Law 
The principle of equality before the law is contained in article 
26 of the ICCPR. This article states: “All persons are equal before 
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.” Thus the protection 
under article 26 is not limited to the rights within the ICCPR; ar-
ticle 26 establishes free-standing rights to equality, the application 
of which is not confined to the rights set forth in the ICCPR.257 The 
HRC has stated: 
[A]rticle 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee already pro-
vided for in article 2 but provides in itself an autonomous right. It 
prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and 
protected by public authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned 
with the obligations imposed on States parties in regard to their 
legislation and the application thereof. Thus, when legislation is 
adopted by a State party, it must comply with the requirement of 
article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other 
words, the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
 
255 See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 33 (1979) 
(landmark family law case finding the daughter’s rights were violated); Ab-
dulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 9214/80; 
9473/81; 9474/81, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 72 (1985) (finding a violation of Article 14 to-
gether with Article 8 on the grounds of sex discrimination). 
256 See, e.g., General Comment 18, supra note 244, ¶ 13 (noting that all differ-
entiations of treatment will not constitute discrimination); Jacobs v. Belgium, 
Communication No. 943/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/943/2000, HRC,  ¶ 9.3 
(Aug. 17, 2004) (determining that an objective and reasonable standard must be 
used when ensuring access to equality). 
257 See The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination, ICELANDIC HUM. RTS. 
CTR., http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-
rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/substantive-human-rights/the-right-to-equality-
and-non-discrimination [https://perma.cc/R763-2AGZ]. 
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contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are pro-
vided for in the [ICCPR].258 
Therefore, while article 2 of the UDHR and article 26 of the ICCPR 
prohibit discrimination on ten grounds (being race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth, and other status), these grounds are merely illus-
trative and not exhaustive.  
Article 26 of the ICCPR is enlivened when there is a legislative 
provision, or an action or omission by a State Party with a discrim-
inatory impact on the enjoyment of the rights in the ICCPR and 
those which are not set forth in the ICCPR.259 The HRC has con-
sidered article 26 in numerous contexts and the resulting body of 
jurisprudence is large, dynamic, and informative. For example, the 
HRC has found violations of article 26 of the ICCPR on the enu-
merated grounds, such as sex,260 nationality,261 and religion.262 It 
has also held that “other status” grounds (i.e., grounds which are 
not specified in article 26) include age,263 sexual orientation,264 and 
place of residence.265 It therefore appears that the reach of the prin-
ciples of equality and non-discrimination under international hu-
man rights law is vast, and applicable to many different situations.  
 
258 General Comment 18, supra note 244, ¶ 12 (emphasis added).  
259 Id. 
260 See Zwaan-de Vries, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/42/40) at 160, ¶¶ 14–15. 
261 See Gueye et al. v. France, Communication No. 196/1985, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, HRC, ¶¶ 9.4, 10 (Apr. 6, 1989); Adam v. Czech Republic, 
Communication No. 586/1994, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/586/1994, HRC, ¶ 13.1 
(1996); Karakurt v. Austria, Communication No. 965/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/965/2000, HRC, ¶ 8.4 (Apr. 4, 2002). 
262 See Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000, HRC, ¶ 6.2 (Dec. 8, 2004); Brinkhof v. Netherlands, 
Communication No. 402/1990, CCPR/C/48/D/402/1990, HRC, ¶ 9.3 (July 30, 
1993); Waldman v. Canada, Communication No. 694/1996, 
CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996, HRC, ¶ 10.6 (Nov. 5, 1999). 
263 See Love et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 983/2001, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001, HRC, ¶ 8.2 (2003). 
264 See Young v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, HRC, ¶ 10.4 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
265 See Lindgren et al. v. Sweden, Communication Nos. 298/1988 and 
299/1988 U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/46/40) 253, HRC, ¶¶ 10.2, 10.4 (1991). 
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D. Why an Equality Principle? 
Claims for marginalized groups are often made on the basis of 
equality. In this respect, arguments on behalf of women, people 
with disabilities, indigenous people, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and queer people, among others, have been based on 
gaining equality rights. However, the equality principle has been 
criticized for encouraging “sameness” and comparisons, while sup-
pressing difference.266 This criticism can be seen in the context of 
animal advocacy, where comparisons between humans and ani-
mals are often made on the basis of whether animals have human-
like attributes such as reason, rationality, and sentience.267 
This criticism, however, overlooks a deeper point that under-
pins arguments for equality. Advocating for equality is not about 
arguing that something is sufficiently similar to the dominant 
group to be deserving of the equal protection of the law, but about 
arguing that something has equal value such that it requires equal 
protection. In this respect, laws that seek to protect living beings 
from experiences of pain and suffering are fundamentally based on 
recognizing sentience. If something lacks sentience, then it would 
make little sense to pass laws protecting it from actions that may 
cause it pain or suffering, because it is simply incapable of those 
experiences. Thus, in order to have value for the purposes of such 
laws, there must be sentience. This is not because humans have 
sentience, but because sentience is a prerequisite for needing legal 
protection.  
It might also be argued that the notion that human dignity 
underpins equality in human rights law is problematic for poten-
tial equality arguments in the context of animals. As noted above, 
key human rights documents recognize human beings as having 
“inherent dignity,” a value which is said to provide the foundation 
for “equal rights.” Yet dignity is referred to in the instruments as 
“human dignity,” and has been interpreted as something that be-
longs only to humans, by virtue of their rationality, morality, or 
other defining characteristics.268 If only humans have dignity, and 
dignity underpins equality, then it might be problematic to argue 
 
266 Maneesha Deckha, Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals, 27 CAN. J. OF 
WOMEN & L. 47, 47 (2015). 
267 Id. at 52–54. 
268 See MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 9, 22 (Harvard 
Univ. Press ed., 2012). 
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for application of an equality principle in relation to animals. How-
ever, analysis of the historical background to the human rights in-
struments indicates that at the time of adoption, the concept of dig-
nity lacked a shared understanding beyond meaning something 
intrinsic that must be respected.269 Further, there is nothing inher-
ent in the concept of dignity that precludes recognition of animal 
dignity.270 In light of this, there is no real obstacle to legal recogni-
tion of animal dignity and application of an equality principle to 
animals.  
IV. INTEGRATION OF EQUALITY IN ANIMAL PROTECTION 
LAWS 
In the context of animal protection, implementation of an 
equality principle similar to that discussed would have a narrower 
operation than it does in international human rights law. Unlike 
humans, animals have not been granted legal rights in the manner 
of human rights, and thus the principle of non-discrimination 
whereby animals should not be treated unfavorably in respect to 
their rights when compared with other animals, is plainly inappli-
cable. Nevertheless, the requirement of equality before the law and 
equal protection by the law would have significant impacts in the 
context of animal protection. In the next sections of this Article 
discuss the need for incremental changes to laws relating to ani-
mals before proceeding to provide a justification for the implemen-
tation of an equality principle into animal protection laws in the 
U.S.  
A. Incremental Reform 
There is debate in animal law related literature over whether 
to advocate for total abolition of the property status of animals, or 
to work within existing welfare frameworks to achieve meaningful 
gains for animals in the more immediate future.271 The abolitionist 
 
269 See Kotzmann & Seery, supra note 12, at 9–12. 
270 Id. at 37. 
271 See generally David Glasgow, The Law of the Jungle: Advocating for Ani-
mals in Australia, 13 DEAKIN L. REV. 181 (2008); Ellen P. Goodman, Animal Eth-
ics and the Law, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (2006) (reviewing ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nuss-
baum eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004)). 
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argument, led by Gary Francione, broadly posits that the property 
status of animals is the fundamental source of their oppression and 
that justice cannot be achieved for animals while they remain the 
property of humans.272 The welfare argument, on the other hand, 
advocates for incremental reforms within the current legal welfare 
framework.273  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to go into any depth in 
relation to the merits of these arguments. While the viewpoint of 
this Article favors substantial changes to the laws relating to ani-
mals, the likelihood of radical reform being undertaken within a 
short time period is limited. To propose radical changes in this con-
text risks the likelihood that the suggestions will be dismissed out 
of hand, overlooked, or, at best, significantly watered down. The 
experiences of past social justice movements suggests that im-
portant legal developments generally occur as a result of incremen-
tal reforms.274 For example, the progression to equality for African 
Americans may be seen as beginning with the abolition of slavery 
in 1865 and progressing to the attribution of voting rights about 
fifty years ago.275 Moreover, African Americans continue to be sub-
jected to discrimination and disadvantage.276 For this reason, this 
Article proposes that a limited version of an equality principle be 
integrated into animal protection laws in the U.S.  
B. Justification for the Introduction of an Equality 
Principle in Animal Protection Law 
This Article argues that a principle similar to the equality 
principle that forms part of international human rights law, as dis-
cussed above, should underpin animal protection laws. The most 
 
272 See generally GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (Tom 
Regan ed., 1995). 
273 See generally, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE WELFARE 
OF ANIMALS IN THE CHICKEN INDUSTRY (Dec. 2013), https://animalstudiesreposi-
tory.org/hsus_reps_impacts_on_animals/12/ [https://perma.cc/38A4-PP5N] (ex-
amining the welfare of animals in the chicken industry). 
274 See generally DUNCAN GREEN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS 47–67 (Oxford Univ. 
Press ed., 2016) (discussing how significant social and environmental change oc-
curs). 
275 Deborah N. Archer, Still Fighting After All These Years: Minority Voting 
Rights 50 Years After the March on Washington, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & 
POL’Y 69, 69 (2015). 
276 See Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2019), https://www.sen-
tencingproject.org/issues/racial-disparity/ [https://perma.cc/UR33-J7J8]. 
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obvious reason for this argument is that it would enable the laws 
to better meet their legislative objectives, which are broadly to pre-
vent the unnecessary pain and suffering of animals. In this respect, 
the science is clear that most animals – all vertebrates and some 
invertebrates – are sentient, meaning that they are capable of their 
own subjective emotional states. Moreover, according to the main 
moral ideologies, animals do have moral status, meaning their in-
terests should be taken into account when making decisions that 
affect them.277 Further, laws should, at least to some extent, take 
public sentiment into account – and the public is broadly in favor 
of increased protections for animals.  
1. Purposes of Animal Protection Laws 
Animal protection laws in the U.S., at both federal and state 
levels, are primarily directed towards preventing the unnecessary 
pain and suffering of animals. This is demonstrated by the above 
discussion of current animal protection laws in America. In light of 
this primary purpose, introducing an equality principle will enable 
the legislation to better protect the subjects of the animal protec-
tion laws. This is because an equality principle would require all 
animals to be equally protected by the law, meaning that animals 
would not be excluded from legal protections solely on the basis of 
their species or their use by humans. Increasing the protections 
available to animals will necessarily reduce the pain and suffering 
experienced by animals. In the next section, this Article outlines 
the scientific research in relation to the capacity of animals to feel 
pain and suffer. 
2. Scientific Research in Relation to Animals’ 
Capacity to Feel Pain and Suffer 
Conclusive scientific proof that animals experience pain and 
suffering has been difficult to attain, largely because there is no 
universal, objective or infallible measure for detecting and evalu-
ating pain. This is the same for humans as it is for animals. The 
experience of pain is subjective, and everyone reacts to and toler-
ates pain differently. Further, animals do not necessarily react to 
 
277 The main moral ideologies being utilitarianism and rights-based theories. 
See infra Part IV. 
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pain in the same way that humans do. There is, however, recent 
research which shows that many animals experience physical pain 
in a similar way to humans.278 Scientific evidence also confirms 
that some animals experience psychological suffering.279 The dis-
cussion below will focus on research in relation to these capacities. 
This research provides information and perspective on the impact 
of animal cruelty, and thus provides context within which animal 
protection laws apply. This research further provides a foundation 
to the argument that animals which are capable of suffering should 
be entitled to the equal protection of the law from that suffering.  
i. Animals Can Experience Physical Pain 
Lynne Sneddon, a scientist, has cautioned that it is difficult to 
ascertain an animal’s experience of physical pain because it is sub-
jective: “[w]hether animals can feel pain has been a controversial 
issue for many years. Animals and humans share similar mecha-
nisms of pain detection, have similar areas of the brain involved in 
processing pain and show similar pain behaviours, but it is notori-
ously difficult to assess how animals actually experience pain.”280 
Keeping in mind the inherent difficulty in evaluating animals’ 
(and, indeed, humans’) experience of pain, this section will discuss 
the three approaches that scientists have taken in determining 
whether animals experience pain. These approaches all depend on 
observations of animals, as animals are unable to communicate 
their experience of pain in the way that humans do. They are also 
anthropomorphic,281 because they compare animal responses to 
pain to determine whether they are similar to human responses. 
 
278 See infra Part IV(B)(2)(i).  
279 See, e.g., Franklin D. McMillan et al., Behavioral and Psychological Char-
acteristics of Canine Victims of Abuse, 18 J. APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCI. 92, 92–
93 (2015) (noting the difficulty in determining psychological effects in animals); 
Franklin D. McMillan, Behavioral and Psychological Outcomes For Dogs Sold as 
Puppies Through Pet Stores and/or Born in Commercial Breeding Establish-
ments: Current Knowledge and Putative Causes, 19 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 14, 14 
(2017) [hereinafter Dogs Sold as Puppies] (“Events occurring in the early devel-
opmental stages of mammalian life . . . can have profound and lifelong effects on 
an individual’s psychological and behavioral characteristics”). 
280 Lynne U. Sneddon, Can Animals Feel Pain, WELCOME TR. (2015), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120413122654/http://www.well-
come.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/culture2.html [https://perma.cc/DVH9-CHUM]. 
281 “Anthropomorphism” describes the habit that humans have of imposing 
human qualities on their observation of animals and animal behavior. 
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The first method looks at animals’ bodily functions (such as con-
sumption of food and water); the second method evaluates animals’ 
physiological responses (specifically, measuring the concentrations 
of plasma cortisol); and the third method assesses animals’ behav-
ior, and in particular whether behavior such as vocalization or 
physical movement is exhibited.282  
By using these approaches, particularly the third approach, 
scientists have concluded that many animals do, in fact, experience 
physical pain. Many species of animals, especially mammals, pri-
mates and vertebrates (and some invertebrates, too), exhibit simi-
lar behavioral reactions to pain stimuli as humans, such as 
screaming or thrashing about in response to a physical attack.283 
Scientists have observed similar responses to physical pain in ver-
tebrates, such as guinea pigs,284 rats,285 horses,286 chickens, cows, 
 
282 Daniel M. Weary et al., Identifying and Preventing Pain in Animals, 100 
THE HUMANE SOC’Y INST. FOR SCI. & POL., ANIMAL STUD. REPOSITORY 64, 65 (2006). 
283 See Sneddon, supra note 280.  
284 Hilde Vermeirsch et al., Evaluation of Pain Behavior and Bone Destruction 
in Two Arthritic Models in Guinea Pig and Rat, 87 PHARMACOLOGY BIOCHEMISTRY 
& BEHAV. 349, 349–359 (2007). 
285 John V. Roughan & Paul A. Flecknell, Evaluation of a Short Duration Be-
haviour-Based Post-Operative Pain Scoring System in Rats, 7 EUR. J. PAIN 397, 
397–406 (2005). 
286 Johannes P.A.M. van Loon, DVM et al., Application of a Composite Pain 
Scale to Objectively Monitor Horses with Somatic and Visceral Pain Under Hos-
pital Conditions, 30 J. EQUINE VETERINARY SCI. 641, 641 (2010); see generally P.D. 
McGreevy Editorial, The Fine Line Between Pressure and Pain: Ask the Horse, 188 
VETERINARY J. 250, 250 (2011) (discussing pain that horses experience while wear-
ing reins). 
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and sheep.287  are capable of feeling pain,288 and that invertebrates, 
such as eels and crustaceans, may also have the capacity to expe-
rience pain.289 
The international scientific community now accepts, in light of 
all of the available evidence, that humans and many animals ex-
perience physical pain in a similar manner.290 As a result of this 
knowledge, scientists have developed tables for measuring pain 
levels in animals.291 Various organizations around the world (in-
cluding the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
 
287 M.J. Gentle, Attentional Shifts Alter Pain Perception in the Chicken, 10 
ANIMAL WELFARE 187, 191–92 (2001); Weary et al., supra note 282, at 71–72; Kris-
ten A. Walker et al., Identifying and Preventing Pain During and After Surgery 
in Farm Animals, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 259, 259–265 (2011); Ignacio 
Viñuela-Fernández et al., Pain Mechanisms and Their Implication for the Man-
agement of Pain in Farm and Companion Animals, 174 VETERINARY J. 227, 227–
29 (2007); K.M.D. Rutherford, Assessing Pain in Animals, 11 ANIMAL WELFARE 
31, 31 (2002); see generally Andrew D. Fisher, Addressing Pain Caused by Mules-
ing in Sheep, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 232, 239 (2011) (detailing pain that 
sheep experience through the mulesing process); see also S. Lomax et al., Use of 
Local Anaesthesia for Pain Management During Husbandry Procedures in Aus-
tralian Sheep Flocks, 86 SMALL RUMINANT RES. 56, 57 (2009); see also Kevin J. 
Stafford & David J. Mellor, Addressing the Pain Associated With Disbudding and 
Dehorning in Cattle, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 226, 229 (2011); AMY SIMON, 
UNIV. OF SYDNEY, TAIL DOCKING AND CASTRATION OF LAMBS 1 (Ctr. for Veterinary 
Educ., 2003), http://essays.cve.edu.au/sites/default/files/vein_essays/con-
tent_2708/SimonAmy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XV4-TYAX]. 
288 See, e.g., Sneddon LU. 2019 Evolution of Nociception and Pain: Evidence 
from Fish Models, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 374: 20190290 (concluding that it is 
highly likely that fish experience pain); K.P. Chandroo et al., Can Fish Suffer?: 
Perspectives on Sentience, Pain, Fear and Stress, 86 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 
225, 225 (2004) (suggesting fish can experience affective states of pain, fear, and 
stress); VICTORIA BRAITHWAITE, DO FISH FEEL PAIN? 183 (2010) (concluding that 
fish feel pain). 
289 See, e.g., E. Lambooij et al., Welfare Aspects of Live Chilling and Freezing 
of Farmed Eel (Anguilla Anguilla L.): Neurological and Behavioural Assessment, 
210 AQUACULTURE 159, 166 (2002) (observing responses to pain stimuli in eels); 
See G. Fiorito, Is There “Pain” in Invertebrates?, 12 BEHAV. PROCESSES 383, 386 
(1986) (concluding that invertebrates possess a pain system); see also Stuart Barr 
et al., Nociception or Pain in a Decapod Crustacean?, 75 ANIMAL BEHAV. 745, 749–
50 (2008) (asserting that prolonged rubbing and grooming are consistent with the 
idea of pain in crustaceans). 
290 See infra Part IV(B)(2)(i)–(iii). 
291 Roughan & Flecknell supra note 285, at 400 tbl.1; Patrick Bateson, As-
sessment of Pain in Animals, 42 ANIMAL BEHAV. 827, 8234 (1991); Lucia Martini 
et al., Evaluation of Pain and Stress Levels of Animals Used in Experimental Re-
search, 88 J. SURGICAL RES. 114, 116–18 (2000); SARAH WOLFENSOHN & MAGGIE 
LLOYD, HANDBOOK OF LABORATORY ANIMAL MANAGEMENT AND WELFARE 60–72 
(Blackwell Publ’g Ltd., 3rd ed. 2003). 
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Council, the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of La-
boratory Animal Care International, the USDA, and the United 
Kingdom Animal Procedures Committee) have prescribed guide-
lines for research involving animals, mandating methods during 
research which reduce the experience of pain for the animals in the 
studies.292 Further, veterinarians administer analgesics and anes-
thetics to animals to reduce their pain, and humanely euthanize 
animals in circumstances where observations of the animal demon-
strates that it is suffering from great levels of pain.293  
ii. Animals Can Experience Psychological Pain  
It is now largely accepted by scientists that animals can feel 
not only physical pain, but also psychological pain. While this con-
clusion may be considered logical as a matter of common sense,294 
proving it scientifically has been challenging. Scientific methods to 
measure animals’ physical pain, discussed above, are not as appro-
priate to measure the existence of psychological pain. In particular, 
the experience of psychological harm depends on feeling emotions, 
which by definition are internal responses that are necessarily 
challenging to ascertain. Moreover, the experience of emotions may 
be different for animals as compared to humans.  
Nevertheless, there is now consensus that animals do feel 
emotions. Research has shown that “[a]natomical, physiological, 
and behavioral similarities across species demonstrate that ani-
mals experience pain and distress [including psychological pain 
and distress] in ways similar or identical to humans.”295 Moreover, 
it is often the same influences that cause psychological pain in 
 
292 See, e.g., NAT’L HEALTH AND MED. RES. COUNCIL, AUSTL. GOV’T, AUSTRALIAN 
CODE FOR THE CARE AND USE OF ANIMALS FOR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES 10 (8th ed. 
2013) (“Unless there is evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that proce-
dures and conditions that would cause pain and distress in humans cause pain 
and distress in animals.”). 
293 See Rashmi Shivni, It Doesn’t Have to Hurt, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N 
(Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.avma.org/News/JAVMANews/Pages/151101a.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/MP3D-65SD]; see also AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, AVMA 
GUIDELINES ON EUTHANASIA 1 (2007) (recommending euthanasia when animals’ 
lives no longer have positive net value). 
294 See David DeGrazia & Andrew Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in 
Animals and Humans, 12 THEORETICAL MED. 193, 193–94 (1991). 
295 Hope Ferdowsian & Debra Merskin, Parallels in Sources of Trauma, Pain, 
Distress, and Suffering in Humans and Nonhuman Animals, 13 J. TRAUMA & 
DISSOCIATION 448, 461 (2012).  
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humans and in animals.296 For example, at the Münster Zoo in 
northern Germany, a gorilla named Gana seemed to be distressed 
and in grief while embracing, caressing and seemingly trying to 
revive her three-month-old baby who had died.297 Similarly, for 
some time, scientists have conjectured that pigs and other animals 
feel depressed when confined to small spaces and unable to engage 
in behavior that is commonly seen by members of their species.298  
While there is evidence that many animals appear to have pri-
mary emotions, such as surprise and fear, it has also been shown 
that animals with greater cognitive ability seem to display social 
emotions, including sympathy, brashness, humiliation, shame, 
guilt, and greed.299 Social emotions are more complex than primary 
emotions, as they require a level of self-reflection, and the expres-
sion of social emotions contributes to the dynamic of the commu-
nity in which animals live.300 Biologists have also observed that 
some animals experience joy. For example, scientist Klaus Wil-
helm observed that “[i]n the rain forests of Sumatra, orangutans 
swing from branches and splash their hands into pools of water 
with no other apparent purpose than just for the fun of it.”301 Sig-
nificantly, analyses of metabolism in the brains of animals and hu-
mans show that animals and humans share “similar physical brain 
processes,” including “the neurotransmitter dopamine,” which, at 
least in humans, leads to them experiencing joy.302  
 
296 Ferdowsian & Merskin, supra note 295, at 461. 
297 Marcus Dunk, A Mother’s Grief: Heartbroken Gorilla Cradles Her Dead 
Baby, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 19, 2008), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/arti-
cle-1046549/A-mothers-grief-Heartbroken-gorilla-cradles-dead-baby.html 
[https://perma.cc/F5RZ-PVT5]. 
298 See Ferdowsian & Merskin, supra note 295, at 454. 
299 Klaus Wilhelm, Do Animals Have Feelings?, 17 SCI. AM. MIND 24, 27–28 
(Feb./Mar. 2006) (“Dominant gorillas swagger around to demand respect from 
their peers. Low-ranking wolves in packs make gestures of abasement. Dogs rep-
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tists say these actions are largely automatic and inborn and count them among 
the routinized mechanisms animals use to help them survive.”).  
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Research further shows that animals are capable of experienc-
ing psychological illness.303 According to Franklin McMillan, “[a] 
rapidly proliferating literature provides extensive evidence sup-
porting the existence of psychological trauma and its characteriza-
tion in nonhuman species.”304 For example, research on chimpan-
zees has found that that they can behave in ways that that are 
similar to humans’ experience of generalized anxiety disorders, ob-
sessive-compulsive disorders, and post-traumatic stress disor-
der.305 There are also a number of studies on the experience of post-
traumatic stress disorder in other animals, including wolves, ele-
phants, and dogs.306 
Just as it has been shown that animals and humans both ex-
perience joy in similar ways, there is evidence which demonstrates 
that similar factors appear to contribute to psychological suffering 
in both humans and animals.307 In studies on chimpanzees, it was 
found that potentially traumatic experiences endured by them 
when they were the subjects of experimental research (such as con-
finement, physical harm, and isolation) resulted in the chimpan-
zees developing behaviors associated with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disor-
der.308 Similarly, studies on dogs that were sold as puppies through 
 
303 Shreya Dasgupta, Many Animals Can Become Mentally Ill, BBC (Sept. 9, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150909-many-animals-can-become-
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Love Declares a Psychiatrist, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 3, 2012),  https://www.psy-
chologytoday.com/us/blog/animal-emotions/201209/animals-dont-laugh-think-
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pet stores and/or born in commercial breeding establishments dis-
covered an increase in aggression and fear when compared to dogs 
that were not raised in such circumstances.309 The aggressive be-
haviors were likely to have been a result of experiencing stress, 
stimulus deprivation, and maternal separation.310 Further, poten-
tial causes of psychological injury in animals include, but are not 
limited to, abuse, neglect, confinement, multiple re-homing, natu-
ral disasters, fighting, racing, forced work, experiences in armed 
conflict, experiences as laboratory subjects, and physical trauma 
and injury.311  
iii. Conclusion on the Ability of Animals to Feel 
Pain and Suffer 
The above section explored the breadth of data that confirms 
animals’ experience of physical pain, as well as animals’ ability to 
feel emotions and experience psychological harm. This research 
underpins the commonly provided objectives of animal welfare leg-
islation. Moreover, given the research indicates that particular an-
imals are sentient – including farm animals and animals used in 
research – it justifies ensuring that the law provides equal protec-
tion to sentient animals.  
3. Public Sentiment 
Fundamentally, laws are rules that human society makes for 
itself to establish what behavior is and is not acceptable. From this 
perspective, it is clear why public sentiment has a significant in-
fluence on the development of the law. If the public does not gen-
erally consider the law to be valid and reflective of shared morality, 
the law is unlikely to be respected or obeyed. Further, the link be-
tween public normative values and the law is particularly strong 
 
309 McMillan, supra note 279, at 15. 
310 Id. at 20. 
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in the area of criminal law,312 of which significant components of 
animal protection laws form a part.  
Yet it is important to be cautious in allowing public norms to 
influence the substantive content of the law for a number of rea-
sons. First, public norms can change rapidly – as indicated through 
the recent emergence of the vegan movement – while the law gen-
erally takes time to change. Second, public norms often conflict, as 
shown by the increased interest in veganism in contrast with un-
surpassed levels of cruelty to animals (and particularly farm ani-
mals). Further, the law has a significant and valid role in influenc-
ing the development of public norms. Keeping this caution in mind, 
this Article now proceed to outline public sentiment in relation to 
human treatment of animals.  
This section will set out results from research into public per-
ceptions about human treatment of animals. Generally, these re-
sults indicate that Americans support increased legal protections 
for animals. While there is no consensus on the moral status of 
animals, evolving attitudes in favor of greater protection for ani-
mals have resulted in “the enactment of legislation such as the 
[AWA and the PACT Act], decreased reliance on animal testing of 
consumer products, a decline in acceptance of the fur trade, and a 
dramatic increase in the number of Americans who are members 
of animal protection organizations.”313 
i. Snapshots of Public Perceptions of the 
Treatment of Animals 
In May 2015, Gallup, an American analytics and advisory com-
pany known domestically and internationally for its public opinion 
polls, conducted telephone interviews with a random sample of 
1,024 American adults to gauge public opinion regarding animals 
rights.314 The poll found that almost a third of Americans (32%) 
believed that animals should be afforded the same rights as hu-
mans, while 62% believed that animals deserved some protection 
 
312 See Mirko Bagaric, The ‘Civil-isation’ of the Criminal Law, 25 CRIM. L.J. 
184, 185 (2001). 
313 Harold Herzog et al., Social Attitudes and Animals, in THE STATE OF THE 
ANIMALS 55, 55 (D.J. Salem & A.N. Rowan eds., 2001). 
314 Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S., More Say Animals Should Have Same Rights as 
People, GALLUP (May 18, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183275/say-animals-
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but could still be used for the benefit of humans.315 These results 
demonstrate an increase in public support for increased animal 
protections following the 2008 poll, which revealed that only 25% 
of Americans believed that animal rights should be “on par” with 
human rights.316 The 2015 survey found that only 3% of Americans 
believed that animals do not require protection from harm or ex-
ploitation “since they are just animals.”317 
The 2015 Gallup poll also revealed that women and Democrats 
are more likely than men and Republicans to support the view that 
animals should have equal rights to humans.318 Further, there is 
little difference between younger and older Americans in support 
of this view.319  
Gallup found that Americans were most concerned about cir-
cus animals, animals used in competitive animal sports, and ani-
mals used in research; two-thirds of Americans said they were ei-
ther “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about the animals 
in each of these categories.320 However, it seems that Americans 
were less concerned about the treatment of marine animals in 
amusement parks and aquariums and zoo animals, as they were 
about the treatment of circus animals.321 The lower levels of con-
cern for marine animals in amusement parks and aquariums is 
somewhat surprising, particularly after documentaries such as 
“Blackfish”322 were released, which examined the treatment of 
killer whales at SeaWorld parks.323 After the release of “Blackfish,” 
the stock price of SeaWorld dropped dramatically and discussions 
took place among lawmakers regarding a ban on the use of orcas 
in shows in amusement parks.324 Further, it also appears that 
Americans were relatively less concerned about the treatment of 
livestock and other animals raised for food, despite increasing me-
dia in relation to welfare issues in that context.325  
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51
 298	 BRINGING	ANIMAL	PROTECTION	LEGISLATION	INTO	LINE	 [Vol.	37	
In 2018, following news of the tragic death of a pet French 
bulldog aboard a United Airlines plane after his owners were told 
to put him in the overhead compartment of the plane, Garrett 
Broad, Assistant Professor of Communication and Media Studies 
at Fordham University, worked with the Nonhuman Rights Pro-
ject326 to conduct a survey on public sentiment regarding granting 
rights to animals.327 Dr. Broad worked with Qualtrics, a market 
research and survey company, to poll 1,044 Americans on this is-
sue. The people surveyed were “nationally representative in terms 
of their age, race and ethnicity, gender, income and region.”328 This 
survey revealed similar results to the Gallup survey in 2015 (dis-
cussed above); it found that 46.9% of Americans believed that ani-
mals deserve the same rights as humans to be free from harm and 
exploitation, while 47.5% of Americans believed that “animals de-
serve some protection from harm and exploitation, but it is still 
appropriate to use them for the benefit of humans.”329 This survey 
is a very recent indication that public support for the legal protec-
tion of animals is strong in the U.S. The discussion below will focus 
particularly on public sentiment relating to the use of animals in 
research and for food.  
ii. Animals Used in Research  
“The animal protection movement has had a profound impact 
on public attitudes toward the use of animals in research and on 
the evolution of laws, policies, and voluntary compliance by the sci-
entific community.”330 While animal protection groups and the sci-
entific community have historically had a relatively antagonistic 
relationship, the biomedical research community has, since the 
 
326 The Nonhuman Rights Project is a non-profit organization that seeks to 
“secure fundamental rights for nonhuman animals through litigation, legislation, 
and education.” Who We Are, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (2020), https://www.non-
humanrights.org/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/HJ8A-4YNH]. 
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Dogs Out of Overhead Bins, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 22, 2018), https://thecon-
versation.com/public-support-for-animal-rights-goes-beyond-keeping-dogs-out-of-
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1950s, put systems in place to improve and attempt to ensure more 
humane treatment of animals used in research.331 
In August 2014, the Pew Research Center (“Pew”) conducted a 
telephone survey (by landline and cellular telephones) of 2,002 
American adults regarding their “views on a range of science-re-
lated topics and explor[ing] the degree to which political views, ed-
ucational attainment, religion and demographic factors are con-
nected to those views.”332 Pew subsequently published its findings 
in a report in July 2015.333 Chapter 7 of the report outlined the 
data that Pew collected regarding public opinion about the use of 
animals in research.334 Pew found that Americans were closely di-
vided on the use of animals in research, with 50% opposed to ani-
mal testing and 47% in favor.335 This showed a decrease in public 
support for the use of animals in scientific research from 2009, 
when Pew found, through a nationwide survey, that 52% of Amer-
icans favored animal testing and 43% opposed it.336 From the 2014 
results, Pew also observed that there were only small differences 
between the 2014 and 2009 survey results; however, the trend in 
public opinion among Americans appeared to be slowly moving 
away from support for animal testing for scientific and research 
purposes.  
iii. Livestock and Animals Raised for Food 
In 2001, approximately 9.5 billion animals were slaughtered 
annually for food production in the U.S., compared to “218 million 
killed by hunters and trappers and in animal shelters, biomedical 
research, product testing, dissection, and fur farms, combined.”337 
It was estimated that in 2013, about 3.8 million finned fish and 
43.1 million shellfish were killed to support the food supply in the 
 
331 Id. at 35. 
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337 David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, 
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U.S.338 In 2019, about 6 billion land animals were killed for food in 
the U.S.339 This is unsurprising, as Americans are among the larg-
est consumers of meat in the world.340 In 2012, Gallup conducted 
telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,014 American 
adults living in all fifty states and in the District of Columbia re-
garding consumption habits.341 These interviews indicated that 5% 
of Americans identified as vegetarians, and only 2% of Americans 
considered themselves vegans.342 
Recently, however, surveys show that American consumers 
are becoming more concerned about the treatment of livestock, and 
particularly animals raised for food. In a survey commissioned by 
the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
77% of American consumers said that they were concerned about 
the welfare of animals raised for food.343 In 2019, Technomic’s 
“Center of the Plate: Beef and Pork Consumer Trend Report” re-
vealed that 50% of consumers who regularly eat beef said that it 
was important they consume beef derived from humanely treated 
animals, and 44% of pork eaters said it was important that they 
consume pork derived from humanely treated animals.344 Simi-
larly, 78% of respondents to a 2018 survey by the National Chicken 
Council reported that they were concerned about how chickens are 
raised for consumption.345 In the same year, a survey commis-
sioned by World Animal Protection showed that 80% of American 
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339 2019 U.S. Animal Kill Clock, ANIMAL CLOCK, https://animalclock.org 
[https://perma.cc/DLS4-6VWE]. 
340 See, e.g., Current Worldwide Annual Meat Consumption Per Capita, 
CHARTS BIN, http://chartsbin.com/view/12730 [https://perma.cc/HY3D-EE3H]. 
341 Frank Newport, In U.S., 5% Consider Themselves Vegetarians, GALLUP 
(July 26, 2012), https://news.gallup.com/poll/156215/consider-themselves-vege-
tarians.aspx [https://perma.cc/QR5T-A838]. 
342 Id. 
343 Memorandum from Bob Meadow and Joshua Ulibarri, Lake Research 
Partners, to Interested Parties, ASPCA, Results from a Recent Survey of Ameri-
can Consumers 1 (June 29, 2016), https://www.aspca.org/sites/default/files/public-
memo_aspca_labeling_fi_rev1_0629716.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCV6-4WD6] [here-
inafter Lake Research Partners].   
344 Alternative Proteins, Animal Welfare Concerns Shift Beef, Pork Prefer-
ences, FARMS.COM (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.farms.com/news/alternative-pro-
teins-animal-welfare-concerns-shift-beef-pork-preferences-143209.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BZ9G-DTPC]. 
345 NAT’L CHICKEN COUNCIL, U.S. CHICKEN CONSUMPTION REPORT (2018). 
54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/1
  
2020]	 PACE	ENVIRONMENTAL	LAW	REVIEW	 301	
consumers were concerned about the treatment of factory-farmed 
pigs, and 89% of the same sample said that supermarkets should 
source pork from farms with higher welfare standards.346 A survey 
conducted by YouGov in 2018 showed that 63% of Americans said 
that they would cease purchasing meat processed by companies 
which have a negative reputation; however, 44% of Americans also 
said that they rarely or never check which company processes the 
meat they buy.347 Similarly, while the majority of respondents to a 
Center for Food Integrity survey had no problem with consuming 
meat and other animal products if the animals were treated hu-
manely, only 25% believed that meat in the U.S. is sourced from 
humanely treated animals.348 
Surveys also demonstrated that American consumers sup-
ported regulating the care of farm animals. For example, a 2017 
survey by Packaged Facts revealed that nearly two-thirds of con-
sumers considered that humane treatment of animals raised for 
food should be a societal concern and a regulatory issue.349 Similar 
surveys also demonstrate that consumers were  more inclined to 
purchase animal products which come from animals that have 
been “humanely raised,” which is found to be an important food 
claim, even if it comes at a higher cost compared to less ethical 
alternatives.350 Top animal welfare practices which are recognized 
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https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-research-shows-major-global-
supermarket-chains-at-risk-of-losing-customers-over-poor-pig-welfare-
300631690.html [https://perma.cc/9MRQ-4DQM].  
347 Jamie Ballard, Women More Likely Than Men to Care About Ethical Meat, 
YOUGOV (Nov. 26, 2018), https://today.yougov.com/topics/food/articles-re-
ports/2018/11/26/ethical-meat-price-quality-animal-rights 
[https://perma.cc/N8XY-UB88].  
348 Press Release, The Center for Food Integrity, Statement on A Dangerous 
Disconnect: New Research IDs Food and Ag Trust Gaps (Jan. 9, 2018), 
http://www.foodintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Consumer-Trust-Re-
search-News-Release-Jan-9-FINAL1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ6Q-TBQX]. 
349 Survey: More Consumers Concerned About Animal Welfare, FEEDSTUFFS 
(June 2, 2017), http://www.feedstuffs.com/news/survey-more-consumers-con-
cerned-about-animal-welfare [https://perma.cc/UCA9-9PZY]. 
350 ANDREW J. ENNS, NRG RESEARCH GROUP, BROILER CHICKEN WELFARE 
SURVEY 2 (July 5, 2017), https://mercyforan-
imals.org/files/MFA_2017_Survey_US.pdf [https://perma.cc/56RN-NK3N]; Lake 
Research Partners, supra note 343, at 3; How Your Food is Raised, KETTLE & FIRE 
(2016), http://web.archive.org/ 
55
 302	 BRINGING	ANIMAL	PROTECTION	LEGISLATION	INTO	LINE	 [Vol.	37	
as being likely to increase the sale of animal products include ani-
mals which were not mistreated while alive, animals which were 
raised in a natural environment, and animals which have not been 
given hormones or antibiotics.351  
For instance, in a 2018 survey by Power of Meat, it was found 
that consumers were most aware of food claims regarding all nat-
ural, organic, grass-fed, hormone-free, and antibiotic-free prod-
ucts, followed by free range, humanely raised, and vegetarian fed 
products.352 The findings showed that sales of conventional meat 
products without any of these food claims have basically flat 
lined.353 In the same survey, 67% of consumers indicated that they 
were more likely to purchase a meat product with a “humanely 
raised” claim than a similar product without this claim.354 In 2017, 
a study by the University of Illinois found that the “humanely 
raised” claim was one of the top three claims for consumers when 
it came to meat production.355 A study by the Center for Food In-
tegrity in 2016 found that among the 2,001 American consumers 
surveyed, 56% said that transparency about the way in which live-
stock, and other animals raised for food, were treated helped to 
build trust between consumers and manufacturers.356 When these 
respondents were asked where information on the treatment of an-
imals and animal welfare should be made available, 39% said in-
dependent third party websites, 35% said food company websites, 
19% voted for food product packaging and the remainder of the 
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group said Quick Response (QR) codes on packages.357 The consum-
ers held food companies most responsible for the provision of this 
information, followed by farmers, stores, and restaurants.358 
iv. Conclusion Regarding Public Sentiment 
All of this data, collected from Americans of different de-
mographics, demonstrates that support for the legal protection of 
animals has increased across the U.S., and continues to increase. 
This is in response to the heightened awareness of the treatment 
(and mistreatment) of animals, particularly animals used for sci-
entific research and for food. There appears to be a desire from the 
plurality of Americans to learn more about the treatment of ani-
mals, so as to ensure they (as consumers) do not directly or indi-
rectly participate in causing animals to feel pain or suffer, and to 
encourage legislatures to make laws and regulations to protect an-
imals from being poorly treated. 
4. The Moral Status of Animals 
Do animals have moral standing? This is an important consid-
eration in determining how the law should address human conduct 
towards animals. If, according to moral theory, animals are re-
garded as having moral standing, then animals should be legally 
protected from cruel treatment by humans. This is because ani-
mals should be recognized as legitimate members of the moral com-
munity who deserve protection. If, however, moral theory regards 
animals as not having moral status, then there is no reason to 
grant them any more legal protection than is afforded an object. 
This Article argues that animals do indeed have moral standing, 
and thus the government should consider the interests of animals 
when creating and enforcing protection laws, so as to ensure that 
all animals with moral standing are protected.  
There are two major schools of moral philosophy.359 According 
to each of these, animals have moral standing; these are 
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consequentialist and non-consequentialist (or deontological) theo-
ries.360  By reference to consequentialist moral theories, whether 
an act is right or wrong depends on its capacity to result in a spe-
cific outcome.361 On the other hand, non-consequentialist theories 
assert that whether an action is appropriate does not depend upon 
its ability to produce a particular outcome, but is contingent in-
stead on the inherent features of that act.362 Further, while con-
tractualist theory would support the conclusion that animals can-
not have rights,363 this Article argues that such theory is 
fundamentally flawed. 
i. Consequentialist Theories  
Utilitarianism is the most prevalent consequentialist moral 
theory. While there are various forms of utilitarianism, the most 
significant form has been hedonistic act utilitarianism, which 
states that the greatest amount of happiness or pleasure and the 
least amount of unhappiness or pain is derived from morally cor-
rect action.364 This theory considers that that the interests of indi-
viduals are equal and that humans should behave in a way that 
maximizes net wellbeing for the community.365  
There are, however, two main reasons why utilitarianism has 
become less popular in Western countries in the last half century. 
One of the main criticisms of utilitarianism is that it prioritizes net 
happiness at the expense of fundamental individual interests.366 It 
has thus been claimed that in certain circumstances, application of 
utilitarianism leads to unwanted consequences, like punishing in-
nocent people.367 For example, severe punishment may be inflicted 
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on a few individuals in order to temper public rebellion, or individ-
uals may be forced to agree to organ removal if those organs would 
maximize happiness by facilitating the saving of others’ lives.368  
Utilitarianism has also been criticized on the basis that it is 
not congruent with the notion of rights. This is because utilitarian-
ism is a “maximizing” principle in that it seeks to maximize net 
happiness, while the concept of rights is “individualizing” in that 
its objective is to accord and uphold particular interests for each 
individual.369 Critics of utilitarianism are concerned that utilitari-
anism does not differentiate between individuals, and thus fails to 
protect fundamental rights and interests.370  
ii. Non-Consequentialist (Deontological) 
Theories 
Unlike utilitarianism, non-consequentialist – or deontological 
– theory prioritizes individual rights. These theories assert that 
the appropriateness of an action depends on its intrinsic features 
and not on its ability to produce outcomes.371 Thus, according to 
these theories, consequences are an immaterial or minor consider-
ation in considering whether an act is moral.  
Deontologists thus focus on the intrinsic morality of an action 
as opposed to the consequences that it brings about.372 For exam-
ple, if deontological theory deemed that lying was morally wrong, 
then lying to a terrorist about the location of his intended target 
would be wrong, even if that meant that numerous lives would be 
lost as a result. In the same hypothetical situation, a utilitarian 
would lie to the potential terrorist about the intended target’s lo-
cation in order to prevent the loss of life, as a result minimizing 
total pain and suffering.  
 
368 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 206–07 (1974).  
369 Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopolous, International Human Rights Law; 
All Show, No Go, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 3, 13 (2005) (although it has been argued that 
utilitarianism and rights are congruent). 
370 See RAWLS, supra note 366 at 24. 
371 SUMNER, supra note 361, at 165. 
372 Stephen O’ Sullivan & Philip A. Pecorino, Ethics: Chapter 7. Deontological 
Theories: Natural Law Theory, QUEENSBOROUGH COMMUNITY C. (2002), 
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/SocialSciences/ppecorino/ 
ETHICS_TEXT/Chapter_7_Deontological_Theories_Natural_Law/Natural_Law_
Theory.htm [https://perma.cc/R3QY-MDLM].  
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The most popular deontological theories are based on rights, 
particularly human rights. These theories rose in popularity after 
the Second World War as a result of collective determination to 
avoid a repeat of the atrocities of that war. Deontological theorists 
believed that such atrocities would be less likely to occur if the in-
herent rights of individuals were recognized.373 Since then, there 
has been an increased tendency to express moral sentiments in 
terms of rights.374 In this respect, human rights concepts have dis-
placed utilitarian thinking as the leading philosophical inspiration 
for advocates of political and social reform.375 Rights-based claims 
have had some significant success in driving social change. For ex-
ample, acknowledgement of the universal right to freedom brought 
about the end of slavery.376 Further, marginalized groups, such as 
women and people with disabilities, have succeeded in improving 
their social status to at least some extent, by arguing for the right 
to equality.377  
iii. Animals’ Moral Status in Light of 
Consequentialist and Non-Consequentialist 
Theories 
The question of whether consequentialist or non-consequen-
tialist moral theories are preferable has not been resolved. Signif-
icant criticisms have been made in relation to both sets of theo-
ries.378 However, while this debate is certainly interesting, it is not 
necessary to resolve it for the purposes of this Article; both theories 
can be used to support the attribution of moral status to animals.  
Many consequentialist theorists argue that the sentience of 
animals means that they have moral status. In this respect, writ-
ers including Scott Wilson assert that animals have sentience,379 
 
373 See Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of Punishment: Pun-
ishing the Innocent and the Compatibility of Utilitarianism and Rights, 24 AUSTL. 
J.L. PHIL. 95, 123 (1999). 
374 See SUMNER, supra note 361, at 1. 
375 H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 196–97 (1983).  
376 Bagaric, supra note 364, at 166. 
377 Id.  
378 See id. (discussing consequentialist theories in relation to rights theories). 
379 Scott Wilson, Animals and Ethics, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY, 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ [https://perma.cc/R6HW-NGLM]. 
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which means the capacity for sensation or feeling.380 Further, Peter 
Singer, a prominent animal advocate and utilitarian, focuses on 
the sentience of animals to justify recognizing animal interests as 
being equal to human interests.381 
The link between animal sentience and recognition of their 
moral status pursuant to consequentialist theory is eloquently ex-
pressed by Jeremy Bentham, one of the fathers of utilitarianism, 
in his famous quote, “the question is not, Can they reason? nor Can 
they talk? but Can they suffer?”382 
In other words, because utilitarian theory focuses on the ca-
pacity of an action to bring about happiness or pain, the capacity 
of animals to experience pain and suffering means that their inter-
ests must be taken into account in determining the morality of an 
action.  
Non-consequentialist theories, including rights-based theo-
ries, can also be used to justify the attribution of moral status to 
animals. In this respect, while non-consequentialist theories were 
originally advanced to protect individual human interests, they are 
also capable of being extended to encompass animal interests.383 
This is so demonstrated through the following overview of philo-
sophical thinking in relation to the nature of rights.  
Various definitions of rights have been propounded over the 
last century. Perhaps the most well-known definition is that pro-
vided by Wesley Hohfeld, who identified four categories of rights: 
claim-rights, privileges, powers, and immunities. According to 
Hohfeld, only claim-rights fell within the strict meaning of 
rights.384 Further definitions of rights have been provided by vari-
ous philosophers. For example, according to H. McCloskey, rights 
are essentially entitlements,385 while T. Campbell asserts that 
 
380 See Sentient, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dic-
tionary/english/sentient [https://perma.cc/P55K-2XPT]. 
381 SINGER, supra note 14, at 8–9. 
382 JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 311 (Clarendon Press, 1879) (1823) (emphasis added). 
383 See TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 243 (University of Califor-
nia Press ed., 1983); see also James Rachels, Why Animals Have a Right to Lib-
erty, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 122, 124 (Tom Regan & Peter 
Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
384 W. N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING: AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 71 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). 
385 H. J. McCloskey, Rights: Some Conceptual Issues, 54 AUSTL. J. PHIL. 99, 
115 (1976). 
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rights are “moral entitlements.”386 Similarly, T. Sprigge explains 
that “[t]he best way of understanding that someone has a right to 
something seems to be to take it as the claim that there are 
grounds for complaint on their behalf if they do not have it.”387 
What appears to be common to these definitions is that a right is 
something to which someone is entitled and that they may claim 
from others.  
Some definitions of rights, however, refer expressly to hu-
mans. For example, rights have been defined as “those minimum 
conditions under which human beings can flourish . . . and which 
ought to be secured for them.”388 Similarly, according to T. Hobbes 
rights are “the liberty each man hath.”389 These definitions, how-
ever, could be argued to refer to humans only in order to illustrate 
the nature of rights rather than as claims that only humans can be 
rights-holders.  
Further, some definitions of rights appear to preclude the ap-
plication of rights to animals as a result of the preconditions that 
they impose for eligibility to hold rights. Nevertheless, as with the 
definitions discussed above, close analysis of these theories demon-
strates that they do not rule out the possibility of animals being 
rights-holders. For example, according to H.L.A. Hart, to be eligi-
ble to have a right, an individual must be able to choose whether 
or not to exercise the right.390 This requirement would appear to 
restrict rights ownership to humans, as animals are, on the face of 
it, not capable of communicating a decision as to whether or not to 
exercise a right. Nevertheless, it could be interpreted that animals 
are capable of such choice, and that they communicate their choice 
by attempting to avoid pain and suffering. Further, many humans 
are also incapable of deciding whether to exercise a right, including 
young children and people with intellectual disabilities, and yet 
such people are included within the community of rights-
 
386 TOM CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 164 (1996). 
387 T. L. S. SPRIGGE, THE RATIONAL FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 216–17 (Ted Hon-
derich ed., 1987). 
388 John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social Change, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS 44–45 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978) (emphasis 
added). 
389 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84–85 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil, Black-
well, Oxford 1946) (1651) (emphasis added). 
390 H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175 
(1955). 
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holders.391 To be theoretically consistent, such humans would need 
to be excluded from rights-holding – a situation which would not 
be broadly accepted. Similarly, according to Michael Tooley, only 
individuals that wish to continue existing are entitled to a right to 
life.392 Again, it may appear that this theory would preclude ani-
mals from holding rights, as it may be thought that animals lack 
the self-consciousness required to desire a continued existence. In 
this respect, however, animal welfare science has clearly estab-
lished that many animals are aware of their own existence and are 
thus capable of having a desire to continue existing.393  
In contrast, some philosophers that adhere to rights-based 
moral theories argue in favor of the attribution of rights to animals. 
One of the leading proponents of rights for animals, Tom Regan, 
argues that because animals are the “subject of a life,” they have 
inherent value and are entitled to various rights.394 Similarly, 
James Rachels contends that animals that are used for research 
should be recognized holders of a number of rights.395 
Thus, it is clear that any defensible definition of rights is ca-
pable of extension to animals. Some philosophers have already ar-
gued in favor of animals being entitled to rights. Under broad 
rights definitions, such as that rights are an entitlement or a valid 
claim to something, animals can clearly be understood as rights-
holders. Further, even those rights definitions that appear to ex-
clude animals as being entitled to hold rights can either be ex-
plained as referring to humans only for illustrative purposes, or as 
definitions that would also have the result of excluding groups of 
humans, a result which would not accord with public norms.  
iv. Contractualist Theories – A Rebuttal  
Alongside utilitarianism and rights theories, contractualist 
theories have also been influential in relation to the question of 
who has moral status. Philosophers who hold to contractualist the-
ory emphasize the importance of ideals and determine who has 
 
391 See Hamish Ross, Children’s Rights – A Defence of Hartian Will Theory, 
22 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS.  43, 54 (2014).  
392 Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 37, 47 
(1972). 
393 See supra Section III(B).  
394 REGAN, supra note 383, at 243. 
395 Rachels, supra note 383, at 127–28. 
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moral standing by reference to who has the rational capacity to 
enter into an imaginary contract regarding the rules to govern so-
ciety. For example, P. Carruthers describes the theory as one that 
“views morality as the result of an imaginary contract between ra-
tional agents, who are agreeing upon rules to govern their subse-
quent behaviour.”396 Pursuant to this theory, animals lack the ra-
tional capacity to enter into an imaginary contract, and thus lack 
moral status.397 This conclusion is discussed by J. Rawls, a leading 
proponent of contractualist theory. He explains that while “it is 
wrong to be cruel to animals,” animals lack rationality and a sense 
of justice and accordingly, “it does not seem possible to extend the 
contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way.”398 Thus, 
pursuant to contractualist thinking, it appears that animals are 
considered inferior to humans in significant ways and thus lack 
moral status. 
While contractualist theory appears to lead to the conclusion 
that animals lack moral status, it is a theory that is inherently an-
thropocentric, which means it can be attacked on the basis that it 
is speciesist. Contractualist theory bases the existence of moral 
theory on an attribute that is seen to be characteristic of hu-
mans.399 It is not clear why this characteristic is more important 
than other characteristics such as sentience, which many other 
species do have, yet this human characteristic is relied upon to 
deny animals moral status and thus justifies cruelty towards them. 
Further, the application of contractualism would also lead to the 
conclusion that many humans lack moral status.400 This is because 
many humans, such as young children and people with intellectual 
disabilities, also lack the capacity to enter a social contract. Conse-
quently, such human individuals would also be excluded from 
moral status and cruelty towards them would also be justifiable. 
This result, however, would be antithetical to current social norms.  
v. Conclusion Regarding the Moral Status of 
 
396 CARRUTHERS, supra note at 363, at 35. 
397 Id. at 105. 
398 RAWLS, supra note 370, at 448. 
399 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN 
OBLIGATIONS 105, 106 (Routledge & Kegan Paul plc eds.,1983); see CARRUTHERS, 
supra note at 363, at 35–36. 
400 See Regan, supra note 399, at 106–08. 
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Animals  
Therefore, pursuant to moral theory, animals do have moral 
status. The application of consequentialist, and particularly utili-
tarian, theories leads to the conclusion that animals should be rec-
ognized as having moral status primarily because they are sen-
tient. In order to minimize pain and suffering experienced by 
animals, their interests must be taken into account. While non-
consequentialist, and especially rights-based, theories were ini-
tially developed to protect human interests,401 there is no compel-
ling definition of rights that would limit their application to hu-
mans. Further, like rights definitions that seek to limit the 
operation of rights to humans, contractualist theory can be criti-
cized on the basis that it is inherently anthropocentric and thus 
discriminates against animals on the basis of species, which is not 
a relevant moral characteristic. This is because it positions moral 
status as something belonging only to those individuals who have 
rational capacity, a characteristic which is generally thought to be-
long only to (high-functioning) humans.  
Given that law, and particularly criminal law, is strongly in-
fluenced by morality,402 the conclusion that animals have moral 
status means that their interests should be taken into account in 
making and enforcing law. In particular, this Article argues that 
wave concluded that animals are sentient, meaning that they are 
capable of subjective feelings of pleasure and happiness, as well as 
pain and suffering. These interests should be taken into account 
when creating laws that impact them.  
5. Conclusion on the Introduction of an Equality 
Principle in Animal Protection Law 
As discussed, the introduction of an equality principle into an-
imal protection laws would better assist such legislation to meet 
the purposes of minimizing animal pain and suffering. In this re-
spect, such purposes are well supported by both science and moral 
theory: scientific research establishes that most animals are 
 
401 See generally H. Verhoog, Defining Positive Welfare and Animal Integrity, 
in 2 NAHWOA WORKSHOP 108, 108–13 (Malla Hovi & Roberto García Trujillo 
eds., 2000) (discussing the anthropocentric, pathocentric, zoocentric, biocentric, 
and ecocentric theories). 
402 Bagaric, supra note 312, at 185. 
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sentient, and moral theory indicates that animals have moral sta-
tus. Moreover, recent research into public attitudes in the U.S. re-
garding the ways in which humans interact with animals is indic-
ative of a public desire for increased legal protections for animals. 
While laws should not be based in every instance on public norms, 
such norms should influence the development of the law to some 
extent. This is because laws that are unreflective of public norms 
are unlikely to be respected or enforced. In the next section, this 
Article discusses means by which an equality principle could be 
implemented so as to underpin animal protection laws in the U.S. 
C. Recommendations for the Implementation of an 
Equality Principle in Animal Protection Law 
In order to incorporate an equality principle into animal pro-
tection laws, a number of legislative changes are required. First, 
while not technically required for the purposes of an equality prin-
ciple, this Article recommends expressly setting out the purposes 
of animal protection legislation in the legislation itself. This would 
be appropriately placed in a preamble or early section of an act. 
Animal protection legislation should be directed primarily towards 
recognizing animal sentience and preventing and punishing acts 
towards animals that cause unnecessary pain or suffering.  
Second, animal protection legislation should be amended so as 
to include a general statement of equality and non-discrimination. 
In this respect, article 26 of the ICCPR may be adapted for this 
purpose. For example, the statement of legislative purposes in an-
imal protection legislation could include that all animals are equal 
before the law and are entitled, on the basis of their sentience and 
without any discrimination, to the equal protection of the law. It 
may be appropriate to expand this provision to indicate that the 
law prohibits any discrimination and guarantees to all animals 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground, such as species, human use, or sex. While animals are rou-
tinely discriminated against on each of these grounds, it may be 
advisable to include that discrimination should also not be on the 
basis of any other status.  
Third, it is desirable to provide a general prohibition on cruelty 
to animals. In accordance with the purposes of animal protection 
legislation, such a prohibition should be focused on the prevention 
and punishment of conduct that causes animals to feel 
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unnecessary pain or suffering. In this respect, it should focus on 
the animal as subject, rather than the human behavior. For exam-
ple, a provision might require that “[a] person must not do any act, 
or omit to do any duty, which causes or is likely to cause [unneces-
sary] pain or suffering to an animal.”403 The legislation may go on 
to detail, non-exhaustively, the kinds of acts or omissions that are 
likely to violate this provision. It is acknowledged that a provision 
like this would require legal authorities to determine, on a case by 
case basis, what constitutes unnecessary pain or suffering, and 
that such an approach is vulnerable to privileging the interests of 
property owners against those of animals.404 Nevertheless, some 
attempt can be made to minimize this consequence by removing 
the exemptions for industry practices, and by explicitly acknowl-
edging the equality of animals and purposes of animal protection 
legislation in the legislation itself.  
The legislation will also need to define the term “animal.” In 
this respect, this Article suggests defining animal to include all an-
imals that scientific research has demonstrated are clearly sen-
tient, which includes all live vertebrate animals. Research appears 
to indicate that some invertebrates, such as cephalopods (like oc-
topuses and squids) are also sentient, and so it is advisable to in-
clude within the definition of “animal” other creatures as pre-
scribed for the purposes of the relevant animal protection 
legislation.405 This Article also suggests excluding humans from 
the definition of “animal,” not because they are not animals or do 
not feel pain and suffering, but because there are detailed laws al-
ready in place to prevent and punish cruelty towards humans.  
Extending legislative protections to fish (which are vertebrate 
animals) is likely to be controversial. The scientific evidence is 
strongly suggestive that fish are sentient in the same way other 
vertebrate animals are, in that they can feel fear and pain, and also 
suffer.406 In many cultures, however, it is common to catch fish 
 
403 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas.) pt I s 8 div 1 (Austl.).  
404 GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 125–26 (Tom Regan 
ed., 1995).  
405 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas.) pt I s 3 (Austl.). 
406 Fish Are Sentient, FISH COUNT, http://fishcount.org.uk/fish-welfare-in-
commercial-fishing/fish-sentience [https://perma.cc/K6CD-8Q85]; see also Euro-
pean Food Safety Authority Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, General Ap-
proach to Fish Welfare and to the Concept of Sentience in Fish, at 1–19, Scientific 
Opinion EFSA-Q-2008-708 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
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using hooks attached to a line thrown into the water.407 To the ex-
tent that fish can feel pain, pulling a fish out of the water using a 
sharp hook is likely to bring about feelings of pain. Ideally then, 
given their equal sentience, fish should enjoy equal protection from 
the infliction of pain and suffering by humans. However, in light of 
cultural norms, it may take time for such a law to be respected and 
enforced. Accordingly, particular states may need to exclude fish 
from legislative protection until such time that education initia-
tives have sufficiently convinced the population that fish are also 
deserving of protection. This approach may appear inconsistent 
with the overall argument presented here, but history has demon-
strated that real change happens in increments and over time. 
There is little point suggesting radical changes to the law which 
are unlikely to be accepted in the current social climate. The situ-
ation of fish may be contrasted with the situation of farm animals, 
who are also routinely excluded from legislative protection. Like 
fish, farm animals are sentient animals. Unlike fish, however, hu-
mans have become sufficiently aware of the situation of farm ani-
mals that they generally believe increased legal protections for 
farm animals are required.408 
Fourth, current laws must be scrutinized in order to identify 
and remove any existing discrimination in legal protection. For ex-
ample, the exclusion of animals such as farm animals from legisla-
tive protection should be removed.409 Laws should adhere to the 
principle that the law treats animals equally, irrespective of the 
species of animal, the use to which humans put the animal or the 
sex of the animal. Where animals are to be treated differently, 
there must be an adequate purpose that justifies the distinction. 
For example, if a particular species is in danger of extinction, it 
may be justifiable for the law to provide members of that species 
with special protections.  
 
407 See Fisheries Research & Dev. Corp., Hook and Line, FISH.GOV.AU, 
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tral.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/190129-Commodity-or-Sentient-Being-Aus-
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Fifth, where it is determined that the treatment of animals in 
a way that causes pain or suffering is justifiable or reasonable, the 
law must ensure that there is sufficient transparency such that the 
conduct is made accountable. This principle may be relevant in the 
context of animals used in experiments for scientific research. 
Where it is deemed that the use of animals in that context is justi-
fiable or reasonable because of the likelihood of the research re-
sulting in, for example, lives being saved, then the conduct must 
be made visible to the public. If the public supports the conduct as 
justifiable or reasonable, this will not be problematic. This require-
ment may be contrasted with current approaches in contexts in 
which animals are legally treated with extreme cruelty, such as 
farm animals. In this respect, a common legal approach is the en-
actment of “ag-gag” laws, which operate to prohibit undercover 
filming or photography on farms without the farm owner’s con-
sent.410 This approach operates to remove all accountability for the 
treatment of farm animals, as the public is prevented from know-
ing the ways in which farm animals are being treated.  
Finally, there is little point in having strong legal protections 
in place to prevent cruelty to animals if there is not also sufficient 
funding and other resources in place to enforce the laws. It is com-
monly the case with animal protection laws that “lack of enforce-
ment is a perennial issue amid high caseloads, limited resources … 
lack of expertise and a perception that crimes against animals are 
not a high priority.”411 In order to supplement government-based 
or funded approaches to enforcement, laws should also give non-
profit organizations and individual humans standing to bring law-
suits on behalf of animals.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Animals are subjected to cruelty by humans on a daily basis 
and in many varying contexts. Consequently, laws in all jurisdic-
tions in the U.S. criminalize human cruelty to animals. Such laws 
implicitly recognize that animals are sentient beings and seek to 
minimize the pain and suffering to which animals are subject. Yet 
 
410 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 578.405, 578.013 (2019). 
411 Nicole Pallotta, New Animal Cruelty Prosecution Unit Created in Florida, 
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69
 316	 BRINGING	ANIMAL	PROTECTION	LEGISLATION	INTO	LINE	 [Vol.	37	
while some of this conduct is criminalized by the relevant animal 
protection laws, the majority of it remains legal because it occurs 
in contexts and in relation to species that are excluded from legal 
protection. This situation means that animal protection laws are 
actually prevented from properly fulfilling their purposes of mini-
mizing unnecessary animal pain and suffering and is morally un-
tenable. 
The most important, and in the law, the most dominant, pur-
pose of animal protection laws is to recognize that animals are sen-
tient beings and, accordingly, to prevent and punish the infliction 
of unnecessary pain and suffering on them. This purpose is sup-
ported by scientific research, which demonstrates that most ani-
mals (vertebrates and some invertebrate species) are sentient, 
meaning that they are capable of experiencing both positive and 
negative emotional states. In particular, sentient animals are able 
to experience physical and psychological pain in a similar way to 
human beings. Further, moral theory also indicates that animals 
have moral status, meaning that their interest in avoiding pain 
and suffering should be taken into account in evaluating the mo-
rality of human decision-making. Moreover, public sentiment is 
clearly in favor of improving the legal protections for animals, and 
in particular, for many species that are currently discriminated 
against on the basis of their species or the manner in which they 
are used by humans. Thus, not only do scientific research and 
moral theory support improved legal protections for animals, such 
changes would also accord with normative values, which would in-
fluence legal standard setting. 
This Article contends that the introduction of an equality prin-
ciple, analogous to that used in international human rights law, as 
a standard that underpins animal protection laws, would enable 
those laws to better meet their primary purpose. In international 
human rights law, the equality principle means that all human be-
ings are equal before the law and entitled, without discrimination, 
to the equal protection of the law. Similarly, if applied to animals, 
such a principle would mean that all non-human animals are rec-
ognized as being equal before the law and being entitled to the 
equal protection of the law, including equal protection from the in-
fliction of unnecessary pain and suffering by humans.  
In concrete terms, implementing an equality principle would 
require significant amendments to animal protection laws. In 
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particular, it would be beneficial to expressly state the purposes of 
animal protection laws in the relevant legislation, including the 
primary purpose of preventing and punishing conduct towards an-
imals that causes, or is likely to cause, unnecessary pain and suf-
fering. Further, a general statement providing that all animals are 
equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the 
law should be included in the legislation. In terms of substantive 
provisions, a general anti-cruelty provision should be included to 
prohibit human conduct towards animals that causes, or is likely 
to cause, unnecessary pain and suffering. This provision should ap-
ply to all sentient animals. That said, it may be necessary to ex-
clude fish until the public are sufficiently educated to understand 
that fish are also capable of experiencing pain and suffering. While 
they are incremental in the way described, even these changes may 
at first appear quite radical. The justifications provided for the law 
to develop in this direction, however, are compelling. Not only 
would such legal protections prevent much needless pain and suf-
fering of animals, they would also improve the moral validity of 
animal protection laws.  
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